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In response to recently heightened public concern about highway deaths
and injuries attributable to drunk driving, many states and localities
are establishing sobriety checkpoints at which police briefly stop and in-
vestigate all drivers. These checkpoints result in the detention and crimi-
nal investigation of hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens based
only upon the statistical likelihood that a certain percentage of them are
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intoxicated, and not upon any individualized suspicion of crime. Sobriety
checkpoints could be found unconstitutional under traditional interpre-
tations of the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement, as well as
under the more recent fourth amendment balancing test. These road-
blocks could also be rejected by policymakers because they have not been
demonstrated to be effective in detecting or deterring drunk drivers, and
because they are inconsistent with fundamental values underlying the
fourth amendment. In the event that some jurisdictions choose to operate
sobriety checkpoints, specific procedural safeguards should be imple-
mented to minimize their interference with fourth amendment interests.
INTRODUCTION
Intensified public concern over the ravages of drunk driving has re-
cently generated an arsenal of new laws and reduction strategies.' One
increasingly popular but troublesome measure is the sobriety check-
point or, less euphemistically, the drunk driving roadblock.2 The many
' In 1982, 21 states passed strict anti-drunk driving laws. OFFICE OF STATE PRO-
GRAM ASSISTANCE, STATE LEGISLATION INTRODUCED AND/OR ENACTED DURING
THE 1982 LEGISLATIVE SESSION - ALCOHOL AND DRUNK DRIVING 1-la Table 1
(1982) (378 bills involving alcohol safety introduced in 1982; 38 bills enacted) (copy on
file with U.C. Davis Law Review); see also NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ALCOHOL & HIGHWAY
SAFETY LAWS: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW (1981).
2 The National Transportation Safety Board has described the basic features of the
typical drunk driving roadblock:
1) Police agencies select the times of operation and locations of check-
points, based on empirical evidence of high DWI [driving while intoxi-
cated] activity or alcohol-related crashes.
2) Checkpoint sites are established with high visibility, including warn-
ing signs, flashing lights, flares, police vehicles, and the presence of uni-
formed officers.
3) Police officers conducting the checkpoint either stop all traffic or use
some preestablished, nonbiased formula to decide which vehicles to stop -
for example, every tenth vehicle.
4) After being stopped, a motorist may be requested to produce a
driver's license or vehicle registration and is asked questions while the of-
ficer looks for signs of alcohol impairment. In some cases where license/
registration checks are not made, the stop is very brief (15 to 30 seconds).
5) Based on his or her observations, the police officer either waves the
motorist on or directs him or her to a secondary area for further investiga-
tion. In the latter case, a roadside psychomotor test (e.g., walking a
straight line) or a breath-alcohol test is usually requested.
6) If the driver fails these tests and the officer has probable cause, the
motorist is arrested for DWI.
7) The arrested driver is then transported to the station for booking and
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influential proponents of roadblocks include the Presidential Commis-
sion on Drunk Driving,3 various citizens' anti-drunk driving groups,4
and police and prosecutors in jurisdictions around the country.' Adding
to the momentum is a new federal law that qualifies states for supple-
mental highway safety grants if their police forces establish sobriety
checkpoints.6
At drunk driving roadblocks, police officers require every passing
driver (or every nth driver) to stop for a brief visual inspection and
questioning. If an officer suspects intoxication, he may direct the driver
to the side of the road for further investigation. If there is probable
cause to believe a driver is intoxicated, the driver may be arrested and
subject to criminal prosecution and punishment. Such mass stops of un-
suspected ordinary citizens for purposes of criminal investigation are
unprecedented. Yet, they have been allowed to take root with little seri-
ous scrutiny.
The sense of urgency surrounding drunk driving has discouraged
careful legal or policy analysis of sobriety checkpoints. Neither the Su-
preme Court nor any other federal court has ruled upon the legality of
drunk driving roadblock investigations.7 The state courts that have re-
is requested to submit to an evidential breath-alcohol test. Refusal to sub-
mit to such a test invokes the State's implied consent penalties.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, SAFETY STUDY, DETERRENCE OF
DRUNK DRIVING: THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LI-
CENSE REVOCATIONS (1984) [hereafter NTSB STUDY], quoted in 67 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 471, 472-73 (1984).
' PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 14 (1983)
[hereafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT] (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law
Review).
' The New York Governor's Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force, comprised of
police officials, prosecutors, and members of citizens' groups such as Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) concluded that "the
systematic, constitutionally conducted traffic checkpoint is the single most effective ac-
tion in raising the community's perception of the risk of being detected and appre-
hended for drunk driving." GOVERNOR'S ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY TASK
FORCE, DWI - DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 103 (1981).
' Drunk driving roadblocks have been used in at least 21 states. 67 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 471, 472 (1984) (citing NTSB STUDY, supra note 2).
' Highway Safety Act of 1966 as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). The regulation
specific to roadblocks is found at 23 C.F.R. § 1309.6(11) (1984).
' Two federal court cases involved investigations similar to those conducted at sobri-
ety checkpoints, but did not rule upon the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint inves-
tigations. Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984), described infra note 8;
Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106, 113 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (consent decree resolving
issues presented by challenge to "saturation enforcement" roadblocks, "aimed at
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viewed these investigations have arrived at varying conclusions, on the
whole without thoroughly analyzing the fundamental issue of whether
any sobriety checkpoint investigation is inherently unconstitutional be-
cause it is not based upon individualized suspicion. Rather, the courts
have focused on the adequacy of the particular procedural safeguards
attending the checkpoint operations at issue.8 They also have focused
predominantly on the initial stop, ignoring the numerous discretionary
decisions and more intrusive investigations that ensue.9 Neither the
mak[ing] many arrests for offenses ranging from DWI, Wanted Persons, Stolen Trucks
and Cars, Drugs and Narcotics, and so forth").
These state court decisions largely assume, without substantial discussion, that
drunk driving roadblocks would be constitutional if they were implemented with cer-
tain procedural safeguards. Accordingly, most courts have focused upon the adequacy of
checkpoint procedures. For cases holding such procedures to be adequate, see Idaho v.
Baker, No. 24-6693-82 (Idaho Magis. Ct. May 11, 1983); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan.
529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); State v.
Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518,
473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984); accord 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 471 (1984).
For cases holding such procedures to be inadequate, see State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349
(1983); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
Only two decisions discuss in any depth the crucial issue of whether any investiga-
tion conducted at a drunk driving roadblock is inherently unconstitutional for want of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Both decisions hold drunk driving roadblocks
per se unconstitutional, regardless of their specific operational details. State v. Bartley,
125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984); cf Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984) (automo-
bile stops to conduct drunk driving survey and not for law enforcement purposes up-
held when participation voluntary and other procedural safeguards observed; under this
reasoning, drunk driving roadblock conducted for law enforcement purposes probably
would be per se unconstitutional). With very little discussion, one court appeared to
reach the converse conclusion. Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983) (drunk driving roadblock operated for law enforcement purposes held con-
stitutional; driver's conviction affirmed).
The Indiana Court of Appeals employed still another mode of analysis and invali-
dated a drunk driving roadblock investigation because the government had not proved
that there were no less intrusive methods for combating drunk driving. State v.
McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The court stated that in the
future, "a proper showing by the state that the roadblock method is more effective than
traditional methods of drunk driving law enforcement might tip the balance in favor of
the reasonableness of the roadblock procedure." Id. at 1142. However, the court noted
that deterrence might effectively be achieved by advance publicity of a concentrated
anti-drunk driving campaign using traditional law enforcement tactics, and therefore
concluded that "the deterrent qualities of a publicized DWI roadblock would not,
standing alone, render that procedure reasonable." Id.
' For a discussion of discretionary decisions and intrusive investigations police of-
[Vol. 18:595
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courts nor the policymakers approving drunk driving roadblocks have
provided sufficient guidance to field officers regarding procedures to
follow after the initial vehicle stop.'0 The procedures actually followed
have included the use of handheld devices to test every driver's breath
for alcohol" and, in at least one case, the use of trained dogs to sniff
every vehicle for narcotics. 2 Further, both the courts and the policy-
makers authorizing sobriety checkpoints have uncritically endorsed
their effectiveness, without sufficiently considering alternative drunk
driving countermeasures that do not infringe on constitutional rights.
There have been few rigorous efforts to evaluate the impact of sobriety
checkpoints in reducing fatalities or injuries; data suggesting little, if
any, positive impact are often overlooked by policymakers and courts.13
Questioning the legality, efficacy, and desirability of drunk driving
countermeasures, including drunk driving roadblocks, is not popular;
anti-drunk driving sentiment runs too high. 4 The rush to embrace
roadblocks reflects an understandable popular desire to stem the tragic
ficers can make at sobriety checkpoints, see infra text accompanying notes 65 & 232-
42.
" For example, the Westchester County, New York Manual of Procedure requires
the officer to "look for articulable facts, such as an odor of alcoholic beverage, slurred
speech, the general appearance and/or other behavior normally associated with the
D.W.I. violator," but does not place any limits on the officer's conduct except that it be
"consistent with good judgment." WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, MANUAL OF PROCEDURE No. 942, DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI)
- SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS 2 (May 18, 1983) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law
Review). These guidelines typically leave unanswered many questions about a sobriety
checkpoint investigation. For example, while officers are generally instructed to be alert
for any contraband lying in a car in plain view, it remains unclear whether the officer
should use a flashlight to inspect the vehicle for open liquor bottles or other signs of
drinking. Similarly unclear is whether a police officer may - or, indeed, should - use
a handheld breath testing device to test the breath of every driver coming through the
roadblock for alcohol. Using such a small device may well be more accurate and seemly
than using the officer's nostrils. See infra note 256.
" See Letter to the Editor from Robert Voas, Wash. Post, July 9, 1983, at A20, col.
3 (reporting the use of such a device by Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police at a
drunk driving roadblock on June 14, 1983, apparently the first use of such a device in
the United States).
12 See infra note 243.
" See, e.g., infra note 200.
"4 Some checkpoint proponents claim that drunk driving roadblocks are "overwhelm-
ingly favored by the public as an enforcement tool." A. WILLIAMS & A. LUND, INSUR-
ANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF ROADBLOCKS ON
DRINKING & DRIVING (1984) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review). But see
Grossman, The Maryland Roadblocks - Ineffective, Intrusive and Unpopular, Balti-
more Sun, Dec. 23, 1982, at A9, col. 2.
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deaths and injuries caused by drunk drivers. Nevertheless, skepticism
about a radically new, intrusive police strategy always is warranted. It
would be extremely unwise to accept drunk driving roadblocks without
the most careful examination. 5
Most of the limited scholarly debate about drunk driving roadblocks
has been waged in constitutional terms and, like the cases, has concen-
trated on the procedural details of the initial stop. 6 This Article con-
tends that, regardless of the procedures, these mass suspicionless inves-
tigations may violate the fourth amendment. However, even if federal
and state courts uphold sobriety checkpoint investigations under the
" As the Supreme Court stated, when striking down random searches of automo-
biles, which the government asserted to be necessary to deal with the grave illegal im-
migration problem:
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem
• . . is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant
tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain
exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pres-
sures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. It is well
to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his return from the
Nuremberg Trials:
"These [Fourth Amendment rights] . . . belong in the catalog of indis-
pensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting ter-
ror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also infra note
193 and text accompanying note 344.
6 Like most of the cases concerning sobriety checkpoints, the limited scholarly dis-
cussion of these checkpoints does not critically examine the fundamental constitutional
and policy questions they present: whether the absence of individualized suspicion vio-
lates the fourth amendment and whether they are uniquely effective in curtailing drunk
driving. Instead, like the judicial decisions, the scholarly discussions focus largely on
recommended procedural safeguards. See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the
Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457
(1983) (recommends operating roadblocks pursuant to area search warrants and with
certain physical features) [hereafter Note, Roadblock Seizures]; Note, Filling in the
Blanks after Prouse: A New Standard for the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20 LAND
& WATER L. REv. 241 (1985) (recommends specific measures to ensure that motorists
are stopped according to neutral and predetermined criteria); Comment, Sobriety
Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in Light of Delaware v. Prouse?, 28 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 813 (1984) (urges each state to develop rules for the operation of checkpoints).
But see Comment, The Fourth Amendment Roadblock Against Detecting Drunk Driv-
ers: Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 28 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 475 (1984) (concludes
that roadblocks are unconstitutional and not the only practical measure for deterring
and apprehending drunk drivers).
600 [Vol. 18:595
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fourth amendment' 7 and analogous state constitutional provisions,' 8
policymakers still could reject such investigations because of policy con-
cerns, including a sensitivity to the constitutional problems they raise.' 9
That a police practice might withstand constitutional challenge does not
assure its prudence or effectiveness. In light of their dubious efficacy20
and the existence of alternative methods for dealing with the drunk
driving problem,2" sobriety checkpoints constitute a questionable alloca-
tion of law enforcement resources. More fundamentally, they contra-
vene crucial values underlying the fourth amendment (as well as its
state counterparts)," which delimit the police role in a free society. 3
Parts I and II of this Article examine the constitutionality of drunk
driving roadblock investigations. First, they may violate the fourth
amendment's probable cause requirement, because they are distinguish-
able from the few discrete categories of searches and seizures that have
been permitted absent either probable cause or a lesser degree of indi-
vidualized suspicion. 4 Second, they may fail the fourth amendment's
"reasonableness" test, because they provide only speculative law en-
forcement gains at the cost of substantial governmental interference
with individual liberty and privacy. 5 Part III discusses essential fourth
amendment values antithetical to drunk driving roadblocks that may
provide policymakers an independent basis for rejecting them. 6 In the
" See infra text accompanying notes 28-264.
," See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 194-211.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 212-27.
23 Throughout this Article, references to the fourth amendment should be understood
to encompass the corresponding provisions of state constitutions.
23 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has urged a greater utilization of "subconstitu-
tional controls on police practices," because the absence of such controls "has left the
people and the police of this nation with the ...impression that the Constitution is
our one instrument for keeping the police within the rule of law." Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 380 (1974).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 28-131.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 132-264.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 265-90. Although this Article focuses on the
fourth amendment concerns implicated by drunk driving roadblock investigations, the
use of evidence obtained through such investigations in criminal proceedings also raises
troubling fifth amendment concerns. In his seminal dissenting opinion in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928), Justice Brandeis declared in the following
oft-quoted passage:
[The Fourth and Fifth Amendments] conferred, as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifi-
19851
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event that drunk driving roadblocks are implemented in a particular
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the pertinent constitutional and policy
considerations, part IV urges procedural safeguards to minimize inter-
ference with fundamental fourth amendment values.27
I. DRUNK DRIVING ROADBLOCKS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'S PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.2
It is beyond cavil that a roadblock stop and investigation, no matter
how limited in duration or purpose, constitutes a search and seizure
subject to the fourth amendment.29 Therefore, a sobriety checkpoint
stop and investigation must satisfy all the fourth amendment require-
ments for a lawful search and seizure, unless one of the few recognized
exceptions is applicable.
A. The Fourth Amendment's Probable Cause Requirement
Drunk driving roadblock investigations are not based upon probable
cause to believe that a driver has committed, or is committing, any
crime. Thus, these investigations should not pass fourth amendment
muster unless they satisfy the Supreme Court's standards for excusing
the probable cause requirement in certain limited circumstances. In
some recent cases, the Court has required only that a challenged search
able intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Accord Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1886) (in preventing compulsory
extortion of person's own testimony or papers for use as evidence of crime, "the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other"). Justice Brandeis's views were
ultimately endorsed when the Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
2, See infra text accompanying notes 291-342.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is enforceable against the states
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961).
29 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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or seizure be "reasonable," 3 but most of the Court's fourth amendment
decisions have emphasized that " 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part,
on the more specific commands" of the amendment's warrant clause.3'
The conventional view that the reasonableness of a search or seizure
depends upon a validly issued warrant and probable cause32 has been
aptly summarized by Justice Powell:
[I]t is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of
"unreasonable searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its
command that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Under
our cases, both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, though in certain limited
circumstances neither is required."
As Justice Powell indicates, the two requirements specified in the
warrant clause, a search warrant and probable cause,3" are separate
and independent. The few "jealously and carefully drawn"35 exceptions
to each requirement that the Supreme Court has recognized are also
separate and independent; excusal of a warrant does not negate the
probable cause requirement. 6
Warrantless searches and seizures at drunk driving roadblocks may
well be permissible under the motor vehicle exception to the warrant
'° See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
" United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
" Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257, 281-82 (1984) (over past 30 years, during which Supreme Court has issued
vast majority of its fourth amendment decisions, this has been "conventional view").
" Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
1 According to the classic definition, probable cause exists "'[i]f the facts and cir-
cumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in
believing that the offense has been committed'" by the individual who is the subject of
the search or seizure. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (quoting
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). But see Wasserstrom, supra note 32, at
320: "In [his] opinions [in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), and Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)], Justice Rehnquist eviscerated the probable cause re-
quirement by defining probable cause as 'reason to suspect,' and so, conceivably, as
many as six Justices now subscribe to that definition."
" Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
36 The Supreme Court's most recent fourth amendment decisions continue to reaf-
firm this fundamental precept. See, e.g., New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 743
(1985) ("Ordinarily, a search - even one that may permissibly be carried out without
a warrant - must be based upon 'probable cause' to believe that a violation of the law
has occurred."). Conversely, although an exception to the probable cause requirement
might permit a particular search to be based upon a less rigorous evidentiary standard,
this would not excuse law enforcement agents from obtaining a warrant verifying that
such standard had been satisfied. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 58.
1985]
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requirement, which permits a government agent to conduct a warrant-
less car search if "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought."37 However, Carroll v. United States, 8
which initially established this exception, repeatedly stressed that auto-
mobile searches must be based upon probable cause. The Carroll
Court stated, for example:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were au-
thorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and
indignity of such a search . . .. [T]hose lawfully within the country, enti-
tled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without inter-
ruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying con-
traband or illegal merchandise. 9
Lacking probable cause, drunk driving roadblock investigations violate
the fourth amendment unless, either directly or by analogy, they fall
within one of the narrow search and seizure categories for which the
probable cause requirement is excused.
B. Comparison of Drunk Driving Roadblock Investigations to
Searches and Seizures Not Requiring Probable Cause
1. Brief Investigative Stops Based on "Reasonable Suspicion"
As recently as two decades ago, the Supreme Court had not expressly
recognized any exceptions to the fourth amendment's central probable
cause requirement for stopping and investigating an individual, how-
" Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (search for and seizure of
liquor by prohibition agent).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 153-54. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this basic principle.
For example, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973) (foot-
note omitted) (citation omitted), the Court declared:
[Tihe Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in
searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be proba-
ble cause for the search. As Mr. Justice White wrote for the Court in
Chambers v. Maroney [involving an automobile search]: "In enforcing the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum re-
quirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution."
See also infra note 75 (distinguishing cars from facilities of pervasively regulated busi-
nesses subject to searches without probable cause) and text accompanying notes 249-57
(discussing privacy expectations in automobiles).
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ever briefly." "[Any restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment," such as the restraint entailed
in a sobriety checkpoint stop, "was invalid unless justified by probable
cause."'" In 1968, in a landmark decision, Terry v. Ohio, 2 the Court
created one very limited exception to this general rule: if a police officer
has a "reasonable suspicion," grounded in "specific and articulable
facts" and "rational inferences" from those facts, that an individual is
armed and dangerous, then the officer "is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the [suspect's] outer clothing .. .in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him."43 Since 1968, the Supreme Court
has permitted brief "investigative" or "Terry-type" stops, based upon
the lower reasonable suspicion standard, in a few additional
circumstances.
See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959) (footnotes omitted):
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our his-
tory. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested
was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis in-
veighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to
arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial
control, since no showing of "probable cause" before a magistrate was
required ...
That philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later was reflected in
the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American decisions both before
and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspi-
cion, or even "strong reason to suspect" was not adequate to support a
warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day ....
It is important, we think, that this requirement [of probable cause] be
strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the
officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is pro-
tected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent . . . . This
immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the
privacy or security of the citizen.
See also infra note 257.
" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
42 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
,1 Id. at 21, 23-24, 30.
" See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985) (when police had rea-
sonable suspicion that individual was wanted in connection with completed felony,
"momentary" detention to investigate that suspicion was permissible); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (reasonable suspicion that vehicle is
transporting undocumented aliens justifies brief stop of vehicle and questioning of pas-
sengers to investigate suspicion); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (brief stop
and frisk for weapons was permissible when reliable informant reported that individual
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Terry and its progeny require an officer to have a reasonable, factu-
ally based belief that any person he stops and investigates, however
briefly, has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. In Terry, the
Court expressly refused to condone any search or seizure based merely
on an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."45 The Court
emphasized that the "demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated" - regardless of whether such infor-
mation is judged against the probable cause standard or the reasonable
suspicion standard - "is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 46 "Anything less" than this rule of speci-
ficity "would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
this Court has consistently refused to sanction.""
Sobriety checkpoints violate the fundamental rule of specificity. Mo-
torists are detained and investigated without particularized suspicion.
In effect, they are presumptively subject to detention until the police
are satisfied that they are not driving under the influence of alcohol.
Therefore, Terry and its progeny do not authorize the mass suspi-
cionless detentions and investigations that occur at sobriety checkpoints.
2. Searches and Seizures Not Based on Individualized Suspicion
The sanctity of the specificity rule is underscored by how few and
narrow are its exceptions. In a handful of cases, the Supreme Court has
condoned five limited types of suspicionless searches and seizures: (1)
administrative inspections of buildings and business facilities;48 (2) brief
car stops at permanent Border Patrol checkpoints to detect undocu-
mented aliens;49 (3) brief car stops at roadblocks to enforce drivers' li-
in question was carrying narcotics and gun). In United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct.
1568 (1985), the Court recently upheld an unusually prolonged investigative detention,
which lasted 20 minutes. Although recognizing that the brevity of a Terry-type stop is
an important factor in assessing its reasonableness, the Court did not view this factor as
determinative; instead, it examined whether the police had "diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their [suspicion that the defendant
was engaged in marijuana trafficking] quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the defendant." Id. at 1575.
392 U.S. at 27.
46 Id. at 21 n.18. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this teaching of Terry.
See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
" 392 U.S. at 22.
, See infra text accompanying notes 56-75.
, See infra text accompanying notes 76-89.
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cense, automobile registration, and similar administrative regulations;"
(4) customs inspections of documents aboard oceangoing vessels;51 and
(5) workplace "surveys" by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) agents to identify undocumented aliens. 2 Several lower courts
have upheld two other types of suspicionless searches and seizures: rou-
tine screenings of'people entering airport boarding areas and certain
public buildings" and roadblocks to enforce hunting and fishing regula-
tions.14 Drunk driving roadblock investigations lack the key characteris-
tics that have led courts to excuse the usual individualized suspicion
requirement for these other searches and seizures. 5
a. Administrative Inspections
i. Health and Safety Code Inspections
In the leading cases of Camara v. Municipal Court56 and See v. City
of Seattle, 7 the Supreme Court held that administrative agents could
conduct routine building inspections to enforce health and safety codes,
even if investigators did not suspect that any particular building con-
tained code violations.5  The Court stated that several reasons justified
10 See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 100-08.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 109-17.
5' See infra text accompanying notes 118-23.
, See infra text accompanying notes 124-31.
'5 Some lower courts have upheld a few other types of suspicionless searches and
seizures. E.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (Canine
drug search of students without individualized suspicion, for purposes other than crimi-
nal prosecution, upheld because students' "expectation of privacy necessarily diminishes
in light of ...constant supervision while in school."), affd in part & remanded in
part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982).
But see New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 n.8 (1985) (reserves decision on
whether individualized suspicion required for school authorities' searches of students);
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480-82 (5th Cir. 1982)
(canine drug search of students requires individualized suspicion), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3536 (1983); cf Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53-54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (indi-
vidualized suspicion required to strip search students for stolen money). However, un-
like the suspicionless searches and seizures discussed infra text accompanying notes
118-31, no other suspicionless searches have been upheld on a widespread basis (as
have airport boarding area investigations, see infra text accompanying note 118), or
received the endorsement of any Supreme Court Justice (as have hunting and fishing
roadblocks, see infra text accompanying note 126).
56 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
" 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
" In both cases, the Court held that the inspections must be authorized by warrants,
which should be issued upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative
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this exception to the probable cause requirement: (1) building code in-
spections have a long history of judicial and public acceptance; (2) there
was "unanimous agreement among experts" that these inspections con-
stituted "the only effective way" to enforce the health and safety codes
at issue since many dangerous conditions proscribed by the codes, such
as faulty wiring, were not observable from the outside, and might not
be apparent even to a building's occupants;59 (3) the inspections were
not personal; and (4) the inspections were not "aimed at discovery of
evidence of crime."6 Most of the foregoing factors have also character-
ized the few other suspicionless health and safety code inspections that
the Court has authorized subsequent to Camara and See.6
In contrast, none of these factors is present in the drunk driving
roadblock context. They do not enjoy a history of public or judicial
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular"
building. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 538; see also See, 387 U.S. at 545-46; accord
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required for federal inspec-
tion of workplace to enforce health and safety standards). Drunk driving roadblocks
that have been implemented to date have not been authorized by warrants. See infra
text accompanying notes 322-24 (discussing advisability of warrant requirement for
sobriety checkpoints).
" Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. Of course, the same argument could be made with
respect to many other crimes, such as illegal possession of firearms or drugs. Therefore,
this factor alone should not justify suspicionless searches and seizures. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has never upheld any suspicionless search or seizure under either the
traditional fourth amendment analysis or the more recent balancing analysis, see infra
text accompanying notes 132-62, solely on the ground that the law could not otherwise
be effectively enforced. See Justice Brandeis's ringing dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) ("To declare that in the administration of the crimi-
nal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.").
60 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. While certain low level criminal offenses may be in-
volved in administrative code violations, see id. at 527 n.2, the main goal of administra-
tive inspections is not criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court has expressly recog-
nized that if the purpose of a search is to locate contraband or evidence of crime, then
the fourth amendment provides the same protection to commercial property as it does to
a private home. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 n.6 (1981); G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352-59 (1977).
6 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (pursuant to Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, federal mine inspectors may inspect all mines at established inter-
vals to ensure compliance with health and safety standards); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978) (pursuant to Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Secre-
tary of Labor's agents may inspect work area of any employment facility subject to Act
for safety hazards and regulatory violations). The only factor underlying the Camara
and See holdings that did not characterize these subsequently approved health and
safety inspections was a long-standing public and judicial acceptance.
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acceptance. To the contrary, they constitute a recent law enforcement
innovation that has met with mixed reactions from the public, policy-
makers, and courts. 2
Drunk drivers can be and are detected without roadblocks. Laws
prohibiting drunk driving can be and are effectively enforced through
traditional law enlorcement techniques governed by the probable cause
requirement. Drunk drivers, particularly the dangerous ones, often
manifest their presence not only to experienced law enforcement of-
ficers,63 but also to lay observers. Many drunk drivers, especially those
who pose the greatest danger, are stopped and arrested by police of-
ficers enforcing traffic laws. Probable cause to stop a vehicle for a traf-
fic violation is not rare. Drivers exceed speed limits, follow other vehi-
cles too closely, ignore lights and signs, cross center lines, and otherwise
operate dangerously. An officer's further observations after making a
traffic stop may give him probable cause to believe that the driver is
intoxicated. The effectiveness of this traditional highway patrol ap-
proach is evidenced by the 1.92 million drunk driving arrests in 1983,
more than for any other crime for which national data are compiled.6
Further, unlike administrative inspections, searches and seizures at
drunk driving roadblocks are personal, involving the detention, inspec-
tion, and questioning of individuals, not just the inspection of premises.
The criteria police officers typically consider include: whether the
driver has bloodshot eyes or dilated pupils; whether his breath smells of
alcohol; whether his speech is slurred or incoherent; how coordinated
and controlled the driver's movements are - for example, whether he
is able to retrieve a driver's license from a wallet or a vehicle registra-
tion from a glove compartment without fumbling; how well he per-
forms divided attention tasks;65 and whether the car contains any
62 See supra notes 8 & 14 and infra notes 269-70. This factor should not be deter-
minative. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (noting that if search
warrants could be excused for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated busi-
nesses only when regulation had long history, new or emerging industries, including
those posing major safety and health problems, would be immunized from warrantless
inspection).
63 See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 26 (experienced of-
ficer's observations usually sufficient to establish probable cause).
64 FBI, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS; CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 170 (1983) (Table 23) [hereafter FBI CRIME REPORTS]. Although
many jurisdictions maintained drunk driving roadblocks for certain periods in 1983, the
available statistics indicate that these roadblocks made only a minuscule contribution to
the total number of arrests. See infra note 195.
65 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration recommends that officers
staffing a roadblock use divided attention tasks such as engaging a driver in conversa-
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opened bottles or cans of alcoholic beverages. In some cases, the officer
may administer field sobriety tests - which commonly include reciting
the alphabet, touching the finger to the nose, standing on one foot, and
walking a straight line - or breath tests, which measure the driver's
blood alcohol level.
Finally, the purpose of drunk driving roadblocks is to ferret out
crimes - not reported crimes, but crimes that are statistically predict-
able. Drunk driving is a criminal offense of long standing." It is inves-
tigated by state and local police, not by administrative agency person-
nel. Almost all persons arrested for drunk driving are convicted of a
violation or a misdemeanor.67 A few are convicted of felonies. The trend
is toward increasingly harsh criminal sanctions. 8 Thus, with respect to
all four criteria upon which the Camara Court relied, drunk driving
roadblocks differ from health and safety code inspections.
tion while he looks for his license and questioning him, for example, about his destina-
tion. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, THE USE OF SAFETY CHECKPOINTS FOR DWI ENFORCEMENT
8-11 (1983) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review) [hereafter NHTSA, SAFETY
CHECKPOINTS].
66 Criminal laws proscribing drunk driving have been relatively harsh for many de-
cades. See, e.g., North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (affirming conviction of first-
time DWI offender who was sentenced to 30 days in jail, $150 fine, and revocation of
his driver's license after nonjury trial before nonlawyer judge in police court); see also
King & Tipperman, The Offense of Driving While Intoxicated: The Development of
Statutory and Case Law in New York, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541 (1975). The extent to
which police, prosecutors, and judges discount these laws is another matter, and one
that afflicts enforcement of all criminal laws.
Pursuant to a trend beginning in the late 1950's, all states have adopted implied
consent laws that require a driver to submit to a blood or breath test for alcohol if a
police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver is intoxicated. See Lerblance,
Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 39
(1978). In the early 1970's the federal government funded a major initiative to increase
the arrest and conviction rates for drunk driving. Zador, Statistical Evaluation of the
Effectiveness of Alcohol Safety Action Projects, in 8 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PRE-
VENTION 51 (1976).
67 FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 64, at 162; see infra note 220.
68 In New York State, for example, a second drunk driving conviction within ten
years is a felony punishable by a four-year prison term. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(e) (McKinney 1975).
As of 1982, approximately 29 people were incarcerated for this offense. D. MACDON-
ALD, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, PERSONS COMMITTED
FOR DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED OR CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IN-
VOLVING DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED IN 1982 AND FIVE YEAR TREND: 1978-
1982, at 2 (1983) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review).
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ii. Inspections of Pervasively Regulated Enterprises
Three Supreme Court decisions have upheld statutorily authorized
suspicionless administrative inspections of the facilities of certain enter-
prises subject to pervasive regulation: mining operations, and liquor
and firearms businesses.69 The administrative inspections in this special
category share the material characteristics of the health and safety code
inspections upheld in Camara and See.7" They are further justified, the
Court has explained, by a "federal regulatory presence [which] is suffi-
ciently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial prop-
erty cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to peri-
odic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. '"' Under this
analysis, people who choose to operate such pervasively regulated enter-
prises have impliedly consented to suspicionless searches of their busi-
ness facilities."
Like so many endeavors in contemporary life, driving is subject to
governmental regulation. However the regulation of driving is hardly
as pervasive as the regulation of the mining, firearms, and liquor busi-
nesses. While there is no absolute right to operate a vehicle on public
roads, there is a greater right to drive than to operate a mine, or to
manufacture or sell liquor or firearms. 3 Therefore, the government
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); see also
United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 38-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887
(1980), quoted infra note 108 (commercial shipping is highly regulated enterprise for
fourth amendment purposes); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979), dis-
cussed infra note 130 (same conclusion regarding hunting and fishing).
o See supra text accompanying notes 56-60. In contrast with its rulings that other
types of administrative inspections must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, see supra
note 58, the Supreme Court has stated that warrantless administrative inspections of
these pervasively regulated enterprises are constitutionally permissible under certain
circumstances. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 313-16 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72,
76 (1970).
" Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972):
When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business
and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his
business records [and equipment] will be subject to effective inspection.
Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordi-
nances that describe his obligations and define the inspector's authority.
See also the passage from Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979), quoted infra
note 75.
" A driver's license represents sufficient liberty and property interests to prohibit its
revocation or suspension without procedural due process. Illinois v. Batchelder, 103 S.
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may impose more conditions on the latter than on the former. 4 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has expressly refused to extend the rationale under-
lying the pervasively regulated enterprises line of administrative inspec-
tion cases to automobile searches and seizures."
Ct. 3513, 3516-17 (1983) (due process satisfied by right to hearing before driver may
be deprived of license for failure to submit to breath analysis test under state's implied
consent statute; due process does not require arresting officers to recite in affidavit spe-
cific evidence that gave rise to reasonable belief that arrestee was driving under influ-
ence of alcohol); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1978) (prehearing license sus-
pension for refusal to submit to breath analysis test upon DWI arrest does not violate
due process); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977) (prehearing license revocation
procedure in cases of multiple traffic violation convictions does not violate due process);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (before state may suspend license of unin-
sured motorist involved in accident who did not post security to cover damages claimed,
procedural due process requires determination of whether there is reasonable possibility
motorist will be liable for accident). See generally J. REESE, POWER POLICY PEOPLE:
A STUDY OF DRIVER LICENSING ADMINISTRATION (1971).
" Cf United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (involving
airport passenger screenings). Without discussion, the Lopez court treated airplane
travel as being protected by the constitutional right to travel that the Supreme Court
had recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), and ruled that the government cannot "condition the exer-
cise of the constitutional right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of . . . Fourth
Amendment rights." 328 F. Supp. at 1093.
" For example, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979), the Court stated
that "[t]here are certain 'relatively unique circumstances' . . . in which consent to reg-
ulatory restrictions is presumptively concurrent with participation in the regulated en-
terprise" (quoting Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313, and citing Biswell, 406 U.S. 311;
Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72). However, it distinguished the situation of "[ain individual
operating . . . an automobile," explaining that such individual "does not lose all rea-
sonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to
government regulation." Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973), the Court refused to extend the teachings of
Colonnade and Biswell to car searches near the Mexican border to enforce immigration
laws, explaining that a "central difference between those cases and this one is that
businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the
burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not
engaged in any regulated or licensed business." As Justice Powell noted in his concur-
ring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez: "One who merely travels [by car] in regions near the
borders . . . can hardly be thought to have submitted to inspections in exchange for a
special perquisite." Id. at 281; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing probable cause requirement for automobile searches and seizures) and infra text
accompanying notes 249-57 (discussing privacy expectations in automobiles).
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b. Car Stops at Permanent Border Patrol Checkpoints
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte," the Supreme Court author-
ized Border Patrol agents to stop briefly all cars passing through per-
manent checkpoints located on major highways leading away from the
Mexican border tb detect undocumented aliens. The Court found that
the investigations conducted at Border Patrol checkpoints displayed
most of the special characteristics of suspicionless administrative inspec-
tions relied on in Camara." It concluded that these investigations were
essential for enforcing immigration laws;78 although somewhat per-
sonal, they focus largely on the existence of documents regarding citi-
zenship and immigration status, and their aim is not to discover evi-
dence of crime, but to prevent undocumented aliens from remaining in
the country. Almost all detected undocumented aliens agree to leave the
United States voluntarily. Very few are subjected to administrative de-
portation proceedings, much less criminal prosecution."
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
, See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
7' In support of this conclusion, the Court stated:
[M]aintenance of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the
border ....
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on
reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends
to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.
428 U.S. at 556-57. As discussed supra note 59, the alleged necessity of a suspicionless
search and seizure should not be sufficient to uphold it under the fourth amendment.
" With the exception of major drug traffickers, undocumented aliens are almost al-
ways given the opportunity to leave the United States voluntarily; only those who re-
fuse are deported. In 1982, fewer than two percent of all undocumented aliens who
were ordered by the INS to leave the country were formally deported. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1984); see also INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3487 (1984). Deportation proceedings are not
criminal. Although more than one million undocumented aliens are apprehended each
year, only about 2700 criminal prosecutions are commenced annually under all immi-
gration laws. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 293 (1982); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 278-79 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted):
The Government further argues that such searches [for illegal aliens]
resemble those conducted in Camara in that they are undertaken primar-
ily for administrative rather than prosecutorial purposes, that their func-
tion is simply to locate those who are illegally here and to deport them.
This argument is supported by the assertion that only 3% of aliens appre-
hended in this country are prosecuted.
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Drunk driving roadblock investigations do not meet several criteria
that were critical to the Court's approval of the brief Border Patrol
checkpoint stops in Martinez-Fuerte. Most significantly, it has long
been accepted that, because of the extraordinary governmental interest
in controlling our international borders, boundary area searches and
seizures aimed at preventing illegal immigration and smuggling are
subject to less stringent limitations than other types of searches and
seizures." Although the checkpoint stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte
did not occur at the border itself,8" they were clearly aimed at prevent-
ing illegal immigration,82 and were located at carefully chosen sites to
80 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154:
Travellers may be so stopped [without probable cause] in crossing an in-
ternational boundary because of national self protection reasonably requir-
ing one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and
his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those law-
fully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right
to free passage.
Accord Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (Border area searches of cars for undocumented aliens "draw a large measure
of justification from the Government's extraordinary responsibilities and powers with
respect to the border."). The Supreme Court has " 'always stressed the uniqueness of
the border-search rule, and . . . repeatedly pointed out that its rationale cannot be
applied to any other situation.'" United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct.
2573, 2585 n.6 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 154 (1925)); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-20 (1977) (review-
ing statutes and cases dating back to 1789). The Ramsey Court concluded that
"searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this coun-
try, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." 431 U.S.
at 616; see also, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-74.
" 428 U.S. at 545 (checkpoint 66 miles from Mexican border). The Supreme Court
has recognized that, in certain circumstances, "border searches" to control immigration
and importation can take place at the "functional equivalents" of the international bor-
der. Such functional equivalents include, for example, an airport at which a plane from
another country first lands in this country. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273; see also
United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735, 740 (4th Cir. 1979):
The many difficulties that attend the attempt to . . . apprehend increas-
ingly mobile and sophisticated smugglers at the very borders . . . have
. . . given birth to [the extended border search] doctrine. . . . [That doc-
trine] holds that some searches by customs officials, although conducted at
points physically away from an actual border and removed in time from
the precise time of importation, may nevertheless be treated as border
searches [subject to relaxed fourth amendment standards].
82 People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956), supports the inference that
the pertinent feature of a search for purposes of assessing whether it should be gov-
erned by the relatively lenient standards applicable to "border searches" is not where it
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maximize the apprehension of illegal aliens not easily detected right at
the border." Therefore, the rationale of the border area search cases
could be plausibly extended to these checkpoint investigations.
Additionally, in contrast to the permanent immigration enforcement
checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte, sobriety checkpoints are tem-
porary, commonly changing locales in a single night.8" The Martinez-
Fuerte Court expressly cautioned that the reach of its holding was
"confined to permanent checkpoints"" for two reasons. First, investiga-
tions at permanent locations should engender less concern or fright be-
cause motorists would know, or could obtain knowledge of, their loca-
tions." Second, such investigations both appear to and actually do
involve less discretionary law enforcement activity. The location is cho-
sen not by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making
overall decisions regarding the most effective allocation of limited en-
forcement resources. 7 Their shifting, temporary location makes drunk
driving roadblocks more analogous to the roving immigration enforce-
ment patrols that the Supreme Court invalidated in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce" than to the permanent checkpoint stops it approved in
Martinez-Fuerte.9
occurs, but what its purpose is. In that case, the California Supreme Court invalidated
an investigation conducted at a checkpoint near the Mexican border, stressing that its
purpose was not to enforce immigration or customs regulations, but rather "to curb the
juvenile problem" and check for "anything that looked suspicious." Id. at 256, 294
P.2d at 15. This analysis would support an argument that a search occurring away
from the border but for the purpose of enforcing immigration laws or customs regula-
tions should be governed by border search standards.
" The Border Patrol selected each permanent checkpoint location in accordance with
several criteria designed to promote the apprehension of illegal aliens. For example,
each checkpoint was required to be close to the confluence of two or more significant
roads leading away from the border, and beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border
passes" are valid. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 553.
" Some law enforcement personnel contend that the location of sobriety checkpoints
must be temporary, and subject to change, if they are to have a significant law enforce-
ment impact. See, e.g., Note, Roadblock Seizures, supra note 16, at 1461 n.18, 1484
(citing letters from law enforcement officials stating that roadblocks in permanent loca-
tions would not serve as effective deterrents but urging that judicial warrants, based
upon empirical -evidence, be obtained before setting up any temporary roadblock). But
see infra text accompanying notes 325-34 (suggesting advantages of maintaining sobri-
ety checkpoints at fixed, permanent locations).
6 428 U.S. at 566 n.19.
86 Id. at 559.
87 Id.
8 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
428 U.S. at 566.
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c. Roadblocks to Inspect Drivers' Licenses and Vehicle
Registrations
The Supreme Court has never directly upheld roadblock stops to in-
spect drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. Although several Su-
preme Court cases suggest that the Court would probably approve such
stops,"0 this does not necessarily mean the Court would support drunk
driving roadblocks. 9'
In Delaware v. Prouse,9 the Court held that the Delaware State
Police practice of randomly stopping automobiles, without any individ-
ualized suspicion, to enforce drivers' license and vehicle registration
regulations violated the fourth amendment. Far from supporting the
legality of drunk driving roadblocks, this holding reinforces the rule of
specificity,93 requiring individualized suspicion even for limited police
interferences with individual liberty. Proponents of drunk driving road-
blocks do not rely on the Prouse holding, but instead seek support from
the following dictum:
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do
not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all on-
coming traffic at roadblock type stops is one possible alternative. 4
In two 1983 decisions the Court effectively treated the foregoing dictum
0 Similarly, courts have upheld other types of routine vehicle stops to enforce ad-
ministrative regulations through nonpersonal inspections of the vehicle or its contents.
See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 n.26 (1979) ("[O]ur holding today
[does not] cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspec-
tion checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety
and regulatory inspection than are others."); People v. Dickinson, 104 Cal. App. 3d
505, 163 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1980) (upholding inspection by Plant Quarantine officer at
permanent plant quarantine station near state border to prevent importation of "pests"
into state); Stephenson v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Serv., 342 So. 2d 60,
62 (Fla. 1976) (upholding statute requiring trucks to stop at road guard station main-
tained by state agency, explaining that these inspections are "more nearly akin to driv-
ers' license checks than detentions for criminal investigations"), appeal dismissed, 434
U.S. 803 (1977). These inspections share all of the salient features of the administrative
inspections stressed in the Camara opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
" See infra text accompanying notes 96-99 & 175-264.
9" 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 46-
47.
91 440 U.S. at 663. In the same vein, Justice Blackmun suggested in his concurring
opinion that another possible alternative would be to question every tenth car at a
roadblock stop. Id. at 664.
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as if it had been a holding,95 thereby signaling its approval of stops at
license-registration roadblocks.
Still, the Court's approval of license-registration roadblocks does not
necessarily augur its approval of drunk driving roadblocks. In contrast
with drunk driving roadblocks, license-registration roadblocks meet all
the criteria of suspicionless administrative inspections that led the
Camara Court to approve such inspections.96 As the Supreme Court
has noted, suspicionless stops to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses
and similar matters have historically and widely been used by state and
local law enforcement agencies, and are therefore "accepted by motor-
ists as incident to highway use."97 As with administrative inspections,
there is no viable enforcement alternative. For example, stopping a mo-
torist is the only method of determining whether he is driving without a
license. Likewise, absent roadblock-type stops, determining whether
drivers are complying with laws requiring them to carry insurance and
registration documents in the vehicle would be impossible.9" The inves-
tigations conducted at license-registration roadblocks also are neither
personal nor aimed at discovering evidence of a crime. Rather, they
seek documents and aim at enforcing administrative regulations. The
Supreme Court has clearly indicated, specifically in the context of auto-
mobile searches, that the probable cause requirement is excused only
" In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court
ratified the lower court's approval of a car stop at a "routine driver's license check-
point" merely by stating "we agree" and citing the Prouse dictum. Id. at 739; see also
id. at 735-36; United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1983).
The Court's opinions in both cases were authored by Justice Rehnquist, who dissented
in Prouse because he viewed as constitutional even random license-registration stops,
lacking in individualized suspicion. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6 See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
" United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 n.14 (1976).
"' The courts that have expressly approved license-registration roadblocks have
stressed the absence of alternative means for detecting noncompliance. See, e.g., United
States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970); People v. Andrews, 173 Colo. 510, 484
P.2d 1207 (1971). But see text accompanying notes 102-05. In his comprehensive trea-
tise on search and seizure law, Professor LaFave noted that the cases approving license-
registration roadblocks and Border Patrol checkpoint stops are:
[G]rounded on . . . a determination that, as in Camara, the particular
government interests involved could not be adequately protected if an indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion test were applicable. This being so, it can-
not be assumed that those cases inevitably carry over to roadblocks con-
ducted for more ordinary or traditional investigative purposes.
W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5, at 85 (Supp. 1985); see also supra note 59
(absence of viable enforcement alternatives should not, standing alone, justify suspi-
cionless search or seizure).
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when the search is conducted for administrative rather than law en-
forcement purposes."
d. Customs Inspections of Documents Aboard Oceangoing Vessels
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,'0 the Supreme Court per-
mitted a search without particularized suspicion in a situation that is
readily distinguishable from drunk driving roadblock investigations.
Pursuant to statutory authority dating back to the First Congress,1'
United States Customs officers, without any suspicion of wrongdoing,
boarded a vessel in waters readily accessible to the open sea to inspect
its documentation.
In holding this inspection permissible, the Supreme Court recog-
nized: "[I]f the Customs officers in this case had stopped an automobile
on a public highway near the border . . . the stop would have run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment because of the absence of articulable
suspicion."'O2 However, the Court grounded its opinion on "the impor-
tant factual differences between vessels located in waters offering ready
access to the open sea and automobiles on principal thoroughfares."'0 3
The Court reasoned that, because such vessels can readily leave United
States waters, Customs officials have no alternative means to enforce
documentation requirements that serve important government inter-
ests." 4 In contrast, the Court noted: "A police officer patrolling a high-
" For example, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), in which the
Court upheld an administrative inventory search of an automobile that had been im-
pounded for multiple parking violations, it repeatedly stressed the "noncriminal con-
text" of the search at issue, explaining: "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly
related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures." Id. at 370 n.5.
Moreover, the Opperman opinion emphasized that the search had in fact been con-
ducted for bona fide administrative purposes and was not a pretext for a criminal inves-
tigation. Id. at 376.
100 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
"I1 Id. at 2577.
102 Id. at 2579 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).
loS Id. at 2579-80.
04 Although the Villamonte-Marquez opinion did not expressly invoke the border
search exception to general fourth amendment requirements, it did stress that the docu-
mentation laws at issue "play a vital role in . . . .assisting . ..government officials
in the prevention of entry into this country of controlled substances, illegal aliens" and
other prohibited items. Id. at 2581. Therefore, the Court viewed this category of suspi-
cionless searches and seizures, as well as those it approved in Martinez-Fuerte, see
supra text accompanying notes 80-83, and Delgado, see infra text accompanying note
117, as promoting the extremely important governmental interests in prohibiting illegal
immigration and smuggling. That sobriety checkpoint investigations do not serve this
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way can often tell merely by observing a vehicle's license plate and
other outward markings whether the vehicle is currently in compliance
with the requirements of state law."' ' Likewise, police officers fre-
quently can discern, merely through observation, that drivers are under
the influence of alcohol, or at least that there is probable cause to be-
lieve they are."0 6
Thus, the Villamonte-Marquez rationale itself weighs against the
constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks. Furthermore, the docu-
ment inspection involved in Villamonte-Marquez also conformed to the
salient features of the suspicionless administrative inspections approved
in Camara,'7 including a long history of acceptance and a nonpersonal
nature. '08
e. INS Immigration Control Workplace "Surveys"
To enforce immigration laws, INS agents enter workplaces, pursuant
to warrants or employers' consent, to seek undocumented aliens. Al-
interest materially distinguishes them from these other types of suspicionless
investigations.
01 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. But see supra note 98 and accompany-
ing text.
,o See supra text accompanying note 64.
07 See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
08 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577. Several lower federal court decisions
have upheld Customs officers' suspicionless "stopping and boarding" of United States
ships actually in the open seas, under a statutory provision similar to the one at issue in
Villamonte-Marquez. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Harper court analogized "stopping and boarding" to inspections of highly regu-
lated enterprises:
Certain industries such as liquor 'and firearms have such a history of gov-
ernment oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists within
the industry.
Commercial shipping can be categorized [as] another such enterprise.
Since the beginning of the republic, federal officials have had the authority
to board and inspect American flag ships. Persons who sail under the
American flag accept the responsibilities and the burdens when they elect
to register their ships with the United States Coast Guard. Such regula-
tory inspections have their basis in the international law of the seas that
requires each nation carefully to maintain the navigability and safety of its
own commercial fleet as a condition of non-interference from other
nations.
617 F.2d at 38-39. For the reasons set forth supra text accompanying notes 69-75,
sobriety checkpoint investigations, unlike Customs officers' inspections of United States
vessels, cannot be treated as inspections of closely regulated enterprises.
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though the INS agents may believe it statistically likely that a signifi-
cant number of undocumented aliens work at the particular site, they
rarely have even a particularized suspicion, much less probable cause to
believe, that any specific employee is an undocumented alien. Neverthe-
less, the INS agents systematically question all employees briefly about
their citizenship status, asking some to produce immigration papers. If
this brief investigation does not establish probable cause that a particu-
lar employee is an undocumented alien, that employee is free to con-
tinue working; if probable cause is established, INS agents may arrest
the worker and initiate proceedings to expel him from the United
States.'"
In INS v. Delgado,"0 the Supreme Court rejected a fourth amend-
ment challenge to an INS immigration control workplace "survey,"
holding that it did not constitute a search or seizure subject to fourth
amendment constraints. The Court enunciated the general principle
that an employee's response to INS agents' questions and document
requests would not constitute a search or seizure "[u]nless the circum-
stances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he
had not responded.' ' . The Court then concluded that, under this stan-
dard, neither the work force as a whole, nor any of the individual em-
ployees who challenged the constitutionality of the "survey," had been
subject to a search or seizure."' In his separate concurring opinion,
Justice Powell opined that the Court need not decide the "close" ques-
tion of whether any fourth amendment search or seizure had occurred,
"because it is clear that any 'seizure' that may have taken place was
permissible under the reasoning" of Martinez-Fuerte."3
If confronted with an INS employee investigation that did meet their
criteria for a search or seizure, the Justices in the Delgado majority'
"' Three INS workplace "surveys" are described in INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct.
1758, 1760 (1984). See generally Catz, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Non-Bor-
der Searches for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration and Naturalization Service Meets
the Constitution, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 66 (1978).
110 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
Id. at 1763.
112 Id. at 1763-65.
", Id. at 1765 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (citing United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
114 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens, and O'Connor, authored the majority opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1767.
Justice Brennan's opinion viewed the INS agents' questioning of the individual em-
ployees as a fourth amendment search and seizure and concluded that it could not be
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might share Justice Powell's view that such investigation would be jus-
tified by the Martinez-Fuerte rationale. Nevertheless, approval of sus-
picionless INS workplace "surveys" would not extend to sobriety
checkpoints. Like the investigations involved in Martinez-Fuerte,"5 and
unlike sobriety checkpoint investigations, INS workplace "surveys"
manifest many salient characteristics of permissible administrative in-
spections: necessity for enforcing an important regulatory scheme, rela-
tive impersonality, and primary focus upon a goal other than criminal
prosecution.'16 Another factor that links INS workplace "surveys" with
the Border Patrol checkpoints involved in Martinez-Fuerte, but not so-
briety checkpoint investigations, is the extraordinary governmental in-
terest in controlling the borders and preventing illegal immigration." 7
f Metal Detector Screenings of Airplane Passengers and People
Entering Certain Public Buildings
Routine screening procedures at airports and certain other public
buildings (such as courthouses) take place despite the lack of individu-
alized suspicion. Everyone who enters must first pass through metal
detectors or magnetometers. Although the Supreme Court has never
ruled on the constitutionality of such screening procedures, lower fed-
eral courts have consistently upheld them." 8
These screening procedures share several material characteristics of
the other routine searches that the Supreme Court has approved." 9 It is
extremely difficult to establish individualized suspicion that particular
passengers are carrying weapons or bombs.' While airport and public
justified by the rationale underlying Martinez-Fuerte or other Supreme Court deci-
sions. Id. at 1768-75 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
"' 104 S. Ct. at 1766-67; see also supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
"1 This uniquely important governmental purpose also underlies the suspicionless
Customs documentation inspections aboard oceangoing vessels approved in United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); see supra note 104.
See generally W. LAFAvE, supra note 98, § 2.2, at 263.
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 56-60; see, e.g., McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1978) (upheld courthouse metal detector search because it was neither
intended to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions, nor as subterfuge for such pur-
poses; it was "clearly necessary" to protect courthouse from "real danger of violence";
and no "less intrusive alternative means" for conducting search existed).
120 Indeed, the skyjacker "profile," the chief law enforcement strategy for detecting
skyjackers before the advent of routinized magnetometer screenings, also departed from
the traditional probable cause standard and raised serious civil liberties concerns. Al-
though maintained in secrecy, the profiles were believed to target individuals for
searches based on certain impermissible criteria, including ethnic background, youth,
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building screenings are somewhat personal, because individuals must
pass through the metal detector, they are not as personally intrusive as
roadblock stops.' 2' Additionally, airport and other public building
screenings primarily aim to prevent people from carrying weapons or
contraband onto particular premises, not to detect and prosecute those
who do.'22 Anyone carrying weapons or contraband can dispose of such
items before passing through a magnetometer, or forego entering the
premises altogether. 2 '
clothing, and hairstyles. See Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving,
Departing, or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036, 1037 (1973). In United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), Judge Weinstein expressed grave
concerns about the implications of both the profile system and routine magnetometer
screenings, noting that the profile included an "ethnic element for which there is no
experimental basis." But see supra note 59 (absence of viable enforcement alternative
should not, standing alone, justify a suspicionless search or seizure).
12' In the parlance of the Supreme Court's fourth amendment reasonableness analy-
sis, magnetometer screenings are "objectively unintrusive," see infra text accompanying
note 146, because they are extremely brief, consisting of only a mechanical survey of
the passenger's garments, with no physical contact between the passenger and a secur-
ity guard. Moreover, these screenings are "subjectively unintrusive," see infra text ac-
companying notes 146-56 & 258, because they are conducted by a machine, based upon
strictly objective physical properties, and hence accord little or no discretion to the per-
sonnel administering them.
'22 For this reason, under a fourth amendment balancing analysis, airport screening
procedures are far more "productive," see infra text accompanying notes 167-79, than
are drunk driving roadblocks. Because no passenger can board any airplane without
successfully passing through a metal detector, this type of screening is highly effective
in preventing people from carrying metal weapons onto aircraft. A prospective passen-
ger must either dispose of his weapon or forego boarding. In contrast, a drunk driver
can continue to drive notwithstanding the existence of roadblocks; although a roadblock
may impel the drunk driver to choose another route, it will not necessarily remove him
from the road.
.23 This arguably voluntary or consensual feature has been stressed in decisions up-
holding airport and other public building screenings. See, e.g., United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (airport screening procedures constitutional only if they
recognize right to avoid search by electing not to board aircraft). That one could be
forced to forego airplane travel or entrance to a public building as the price for exercis-
ing the choice of avoiding a search or seizure suggests that such a choice might not be
free. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1974) ("To make
one choose between flying to one's destination and exercising one's constitutional right
[to remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures] appears to us . . . in many
situations a form of coercion, however subtle.") (citation omitted). Unlike airport or
other public building screenings, a drunk driving roadblock could be set up so that
motorists could use alternative routes with relatively minimal inconvenience if they
wished to avoid the roadblock. Therefore, the voluntary or consensual search model is
potentially more applicable to the drunk driving roadblock than to these other mass
investigatory techniques. See infra text accompanying notes 330-34.
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g. Hunting and Fishing Roadblocks
The Supreme Court has not considered the legality of temporary
hunting and fishing roadblocks to enforce limitations on the number of
captured game or fish, or prohibitions on killing certain protected spe-
cies. Professor Wayne LaFave, a leading fourth amendment expert, has
expressed grave doubts about their constitutionality.'24 However, two
state supreme courts have upheld hunting and fishing roadblocks
against fourth amendment challenges (although in one of the cases over
vigorous and persuasive dissent),' 5 and two current United States Su-
preme Court Justices have indicated their approval of suspicionless
searches by game wardens." 6 In any event, the asserted rationale for
upholding hunting and fishing roadblocks does not extend to drunk
driving roadblocks. Indeed, one of the state courts that upheld hunting
and fishing roadblocks struck down sobriety checkpoints.'27
In contrast to drunk driving roadblocks, hunting and fishing road-
blocks share some of the essential features of the administrative inspec-
tions upheld in Camara. They are not personal since they seek only
documents or objects - namely, hunting or fishing licenses, and dead
animals or fish. The courts that have upheld hunting and fishing road-
blocks also have concluded that it would be extremely difficult to en-
force hunting and fishing regulations effectively in accordance with the
,l, Professor LaFave has urged that such roadblocks be conducted pursuant to an
area search warrant, so that "a magistrate could circumscribe in advance a warden's
authority ... imposing limits as to time and area and, perhaps, factors which at least
would support a likelihood that any person stopped has been engaged in hunting and
fishing." W. LAFAvE, supra note 98, § 10.8, at 177-78 (Supp. 1985). Moreover, he
has noted that even a hunting and fishing roadblock authorized by a search warrant
and limited to a very brief questioning and visual inspection still might not pass muster
under the fourth amendment: "The basic and very difficult question is whether the
roadblock concept can logically be extended to game law enforcement without making it
equally available for all other criminal law enforcement programs as well." Id. at 179.
,21 State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 618 P.2d 423 (1980) (three justices joining
dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d
723 (S.D. 1979).
2I In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979), Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion (in which Justice Powell joined) included the following dictum: "I would not
regard the present case as a precedent that throws any constitutional shadow upon the
necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by
game wardens in the performance of their duties."
,2, In State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979), the South Dakota Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless roadblock investigations to enforce
hunting laws. Id. at 725. In contrast, in State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D.
1976), the same court invalidated suspicionless investigations at a drunk driving
roadblock.
19851
University of California, Davis
probable cause requirement. 28 Assuming this conclusion to be correct,
it does not justify drunk driving roadblocks, because probable cause to
believe someone is driving under the influence of alcohol is not very
difficult to establish. 1
29
Another distinction is that hunting and fishing roadblocks interfere
much less substantially with the freedom and privacy interests that the
fourth amendment protects than do drunk driving roadblocks. They are
implemented in isolated settings during limited times of the year, and
affect a very small percentage of drivers. Furthermore, the drivers they
do affect are almost exclusively hunters and fishermen. 3 In this re-
spect, hunting and fishing roadblocks are more akin to traditional, spe-
cific purpose law enforcement roadblocks than to drunk driving
roadblocks."1
After reviewing the authorities discussed in this part of the Article, a
policymaker or court could conclude that drunk driving roadblock in-
vestigations are unconstitutional under the fourth amendment (or its
state counterparts) because they are not based upon probable cause and
do not fall within any exception to the probable cause requirement,
either directly or by analogy. The following part questions whether
drunk driving roadblock investigations can satisfy the fourth amend-
ment reasonableness requirement.
328 See Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 858-89, 618 P.2d at 430 (noting that "the broad ex-
panse of territory . . . much of which is virtually uninhabited" undermines the effec-
tiveness of traditional law enforcement techniques), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981);
Halverson, 277 N.W.2d at 724 (explaining that enforcing law through searches based
upon probable cause would not be effective "since the number of hunters is large and
game officers few"). But see supra note 59 (absence of viable enforcement alternatives
should not, standing alone, justify suspicionless search or seizure).
,29 See supra text accompanying note 64.
110 In Tourtillott, the Oregon Supreme Court expressly declined to "consider
whether a game checkpoint located in a metropolitan area might be overly intrusive."
289 Or. at 858 n.13, 618 P.2d at 430 n.13. The Halverson court upheld hunting and
fishing roadblock investigations on the additional theory that agreeing to submit to
these investigations is an implicit precondition for receiving a hunting or fishing license.
277 N.W.2d at 724-25. This is the same implied consent rationale underlying the per-
vasively regulated enterprise cases. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. Regard-
less of whether these cases could logically be extended to hunting and fishing road-
blocks, they should not be extended to drunk driving roadblocks. See supra text
accompanying notes 73-75.
,' See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:595
Drunk Driving Roadblocks
II. DRUNK DRIVING ROADBLOCKS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BALANCING ANALYSIS
A. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Analysis
A current trend in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurispru-
dence has been to evaluate certain types of searches and seizures (in-
cluding some involving automobiles)132 only in terms of the reasonable-
ness requirement in the fourth amendment's first clause.' The
Supreme Court recently summarized its fourth amendment reasonable-
ness or balancing test:
Our focus in this area of Fourth Amendment law has been on the question
32 The Supreme Court has not enunciated specific criteria concerning when it will
evaluate any particular search and seizure under this reasonableness or balancing ap-
proach rather than the traditional approach. There appears to be a trend toward an
increasing reliance on the balancing test. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 32.
But, for a recent example of a Supreme Court decision employing conventional fourth
amendment analysis, see Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1617 (1985) (in holding that
state's surgical removal of bullet from beneath defendant's skin, to seek evidence of his
alleged crime, would violate fourth amendment, Court stated that warrant and probable
cause are "threshold requirements," and that "[b]eyond these standards . . . a number
of other factors [should be considered] in determining the 'reasonableness' " of chal-
lenged search and seizure).
Justice Powell recently noted that the Court has employed the fourth amendment
balancing test in cases "involving the apprehension of aliens illegally in the United
States." INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1765-66 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment). In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979), the Court indicated that the
balancing test would be applied to "seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional
arrest." However, the demarcation between a Terry-type investigative stop and a
traditional arrest is becoming increasingly blurred. Compare, e.g., United States v.
Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), discussed supra note 44 (characterized 20-minute de-
tention at issue as investigative or Terry-type stop) with Sharpe v. United States, 660
F.2d 967, 970 (4th Cir. 1981) (same case) (characterized same detention as "custodial
arrest" and "de facto arrest").
Although the Court has not said explicitly that all automobile searches and seizures
should be judged under the balancing test, it has in fact consistently employed that test
in cases involving the brief detention and investigation of automobiles and their passen-
gers. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Therefore, it seems likely that the Court would evaluate drunk driving roadblock inves-
tigations under the balancing test, as have almost all of the courts that have considered
these investigations, see supra note 8.
... It should be stressed that no additional types of suspicionless searches and
seizures, beyond those described supra text accompanying notes 48-131, have been per-
mitted under the balancing approach. However, because the respective criteria involved
in this approach and traditional fourth amendment analysis differ somewhat, it is im-
portant to examine drunk driving roadblocks specifically under the balancing criteria.
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of the "reasonableness" of the type of governmental intrusion involved.
"Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' 34
Under traditional fourth amendment analysis, any search or seizure
is presumptively unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional, unless it is
based upon a warrant and probable cause. Neither requirement can be
dispensed with unless there is an applicable exception.' 35 In contrast,
when the balancing approach is employed, reasonableness is evaluated
on an ad hoc basis according to a utilitarian calculus. The ultimate
issue is whether the costs of a particular search or seizure, in terms of
reducing individual liberty or privacy, are outweighed by its benefits in
terms of promoting some societal interest."3 6 Whether probable cause
", United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1983) (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and citing several decisions involving
Border Patrol car searches). Under the balancing analysis, the Court evaluates whether
a search or seizure was reasonable in its inception. The fourth amendment also re-
quires searches or seizures to be reasonable in their execution. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Therefore, even if a drunk driving roadblock investigation is
viewed as reasonable in its inception, procedural safeguards must still be imposed to
ensure that it is reasonable in its execution. See infra text accompanying notes 298-342.
,' See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
In applying the balancing test, the Court in several respects unfairly weights the
scales in favor of reasonableness. On the individual side of the balance, the Court
weighs only the individual interests of the particular person involved in the case at bar.
It does not consider the collective interests of all people whose freedom and privacy are
invaded by the type of search or seizure at issue. On the other side of the balance, the
only societal interests that the Court considers are those relating to law enforcement.
There is a compelling societal interest in maintaining our collective security from inva-
sions by the police, as well as by criminals. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948) ("The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave con-
cern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance."), quoted in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 529 (1967); see also Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1927). Yet the current fourth amendment balancing test
ascribes no weight to this vital societal interest. See Justice Brennan's opinion in New
Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 755 n.5 (1985) (dissenting in part). Conversely, the
Court ascribes too much weight to society's alleged law enforcement interests in partic-
ular searches and seizures by, in effect, assuming that they will be uniquely successful
in achieving their law enforcement goals, and ignoring their countervailing law enforce-
ment costs. See id. at 755, 757 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
A prominent state supreme court justice articulated some of these criticisms of fourth
amendment balancing tests in an opinion finding suspicionless hunting and fishing
roadblock stops unconstitutional:
The . . . most common fallacy in "balancing" is to place on one side the
entire, cumulated interest represented by the state's policy and compare it
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(or even reasonable suspicion) should be required is integrated into the
overall analysis of individual cost versus societal benefit.137 The Court
has not stated expressly which party bears the burden of proof in a
fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry. However, language in some
recent opinions indicates that the burden is on the government.'38 Be-
cause any search or seizure by definition intrudes on individual liberty
and privacy, it can be viewed as presumptively unreasonable. However,
the government may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that
the search or seizure is relatively unintrusive, or that the countervailing
societal interest is very strong.'"
The strength of the government's interest depends upon the serious-
ness of the offense that the search or seizure aims to detect or deter, '
with one individual's interest in freedom from the specific intrusion on the
other side. . . . The semantic balance looks different when it matches the
freedom of thousands of citizens from being stopped and questioned by
police officers against the chance that one or a few will admit to a ...
violation.
State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 879-82, 618 P.2d 423, 441-42 (1980) (Linde, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981). In light of the large number of cars
stopped and the small number of arrests made at drunk driving roadblocks, they might
well fail the type of balancing test described by Justice Linde. See infra notes 183, 195,
& 271 and text accompanying notes 194-211 & 214.
' See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-62 (1976).
... For example, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court repeatedly
indicated that the state had the burden of demonstrating the efficacy - and perhaps
even the necessity - of the spot license and registration checks at issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 167-74. But see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Tihe Court's approach reverses the presumption of constitutionality accorded
acts of the States. The burden is not upon the State to demonstrate that its procedures
are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, but upon respondent to demonstrate that
they are not.").
" Several courts that have ruled upon drunk driving roadblocks have expressly rec-
ognized that the state bears the burden of justifying them by establishing that road-
blocks are in fact effective in reducing drunk driving and that no less intrusive alterna-
tive law enforcement technique can serve this purpose. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom
v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); People v. Bartley, 125 Ill.
App. 3d 375, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1984); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125
(Ind Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d
349, 353 (1983).
"' See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) ("Consideration of the
constitutionality of such seizures [that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest] in-
volves a weighing of the gravity of the public concern served by the seizure. . . ."). In
traditional fourth amendment analysis, the seriousness of the offense at issue has no
bearing on the scope of fourth amendment protection. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra
note 98, § 1.2(e), at 37-38. But see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth
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its effectiveness in accomplishing such detection or deterrence,'41 and
the comparative effectiveness of alternative measures available for such
detection or deterrence.'42 A factor often considered is whether the law
enforcement goal in question could effectively be promoted through
techniques that intrude less upon individual privacy and freedom. '43 In
upholding as reasonable certain types of searches and seizures that are
not based upon probable cause, the Court repeatedly has pointed to the
absence of viable alternative law enforcement techniques to promote the
pertinent law enforcement goal. 4" Conversely, in striking down as un-
reasonable other types of searches and seizures that are not based on
probable cause, the Court consistently has relied on the availability of
alternative law enforcement strategies that do less damage to fourth
amendment interests, including strategies based on probable cause.' 45
Amendment for these reasons [the special problems presented by automobiles] . . . they
should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.").
'4, See infra text accompanying notes 167-71 & 174.
142 See infra text accompanying notes 143-45 & 172-73.
143 The Court has not only employed the "least intrusive alternative" approach in
determining whether searches and seizures not based on probable cause are reasonable
in their inception. It also has employed this approach in determining whether such
searches and seizures are reasonable in their execution. See infra text accompanying
notes 295-96.
The least intrusive alternative approach is not a consistent theme in fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Court has expressly rejected this approach in
reviewing some searches and seizures. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469
(1983) (officers not required to adopt "alternative means" to ensure safety when Terry-
type investigation requires quick decisions); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605
(1983) (least intrusive alternative principle held not applicable to inventory searches);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (In upholding warrantless search of
car trunk, Court noted that the abstract, hypothetical availability of " 'less intrusive'
means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.").
The cases that employ the least intrusive alternative analysis in evaluating searches
and seizures not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion do not explain why
such analysis is appropriate in those contexts, but not in other fourth amendment cases.
A detailed, overarching explanation is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a
cogent rationale for including the least restrictive alternative requirement in the fourth
amendment balancing test can be suggested: the balancing analysis demands that any
governmental intrusion on individual rights be specifically justified by its necessity to
promote a certain societal interest. Accordingly, if the societal interest ostensibly justify-
ing any intrusion could effectively be promoted through a measure that threatens lib-
erty and privacy less than the one being challenged, the latter should ipso facto fail the
balancing test. See infra note 293.
,' See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2580 (1983);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
, ' For example, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court
struck down random car stops by Border Patrol agents, away from international bor-
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In evaluating the intrusiveness of a particular search or seizure, the
Court distinguishes two factors: objective and subjective intrusiveness.
The degree of objective or physical intrusiveness of a particular search
or seizure depends upon its nature, duration, and scope. The degree of
subjective or psychological intrusiveness turns upon a hypothetical indi-
vidual's perception of and reaction to it.'46 The Court asks whether the
search or seizure is likely to stimulate feelings of "concern," '"fright,"
"surprise,"... "embarrassment, "148 "anxiety,"14 9  or "awe"' 0  in its
target. '
The Supreme Court's discussion of subjective intrusiveness does not
rely on empirical evidence - either specific evidence regarding the re-
actions of particular individuals, or generalized evidence such as public
opinion surveys or expert opinions.' 2 Instead, the Court makes as-
ders, to make brief inquiries regarding citizenship and residency. The Court stated:
"We are not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement require this degree
of interference with lawful traffic." Id. at 883 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
"Our decision .. . takes into account . . . the availability of alternatives to random
stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion." Id. at 883 n.8.
146 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
1,, Id. at 558-59.
',' United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
"' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
150 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2580 (1983).
.5. The more recent suspicionless search and seizure cases discussed in part I of this
Article were expressly decided pursuant to the reasonableness standard. See, e.g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976). Some of the older opinions discussed in part I, which first recognized ex-
ceptions to the probable cause requirement, were not explicitly phrased in the current
balancing rubric. However, the criteria that they considered can readily be rephrased in
these terms. For example, in permitting suspicionless housing inspections, Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), stressed two factors that can be viewed as
lessening the subjective intrusiveness of these inspections: they had a long history of
public and judicial acceptance, and an administrative rather than a criminal purpose.
Id. at 537. Individuals should be relatively unsurprised and unfrightened by searches to
which they are accustomed, and which will almost certainly not lead to criminal prose-
cution or sanctions. Camara expressly noted that an administrative inspection may be
"a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instru-
mentalities of crime." Id. at 530. Another factor stressed by Camara, the impersonal
nature of housing inspections, can be described as lessening their objective intrusiveness.
See id. The final factor upon which Camara relied constitutes the governmental side of
the balance under the reasonableness approach - the absence of viable alternatives for
promoting important governmental interests. Id.
"52 Perhaps most motorists would not mind being stopped at drunk driving road-
blocks. See supra note 14. However, public opinion should hardly be a determinative
measure of constitutionality; if it were, we probably would have very few rights. The
volatility and inconsistency of public opinion is another reason to avoid relying on it in
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sumptions about an appropriate reaction to a particular type of search
or seizure. Thus, the Court's fourth amendment balancing decisions
rely on purported descriptive observations that are essentially prescrip-
tive value judgments.1"3
In evaluating subjective intrusiveness, the Court has primarily fo-
cused on whether individuals are, or would perceive themselves to be,
arbitrarily or discriminatorily singled out by the police. The Court
presumes that individuals who perceive themselves as victims of arbi-
trariness or discrimination will define the search or seizure as especially
intrusive. Conversely, the Court presumes that individuals who perceive
that they are being subjected to the same treatment as every other simi-
larly situated individual will define the police encounter as relatively
unintrusive.'54 Another important determinant of the degree of subjec-
constitutional adjudication. As Justice Brennan recently cautioned:
Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials -
perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens - may be tempted to
conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the
perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a
true balance between the individual and society depends on the recognition
of "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." . . . That right protects the privacy
and security of the individual unless the authorities can cross a specific
threshold of need, designated by the term "probable cause."
New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 754 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
(footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
,' See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) ("[T]he
stops [at border crossing checkpoints] should not be frightening or offensive because of
their public and relatively routine nature.").
,' For example, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975), the Court
stated:
[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less
intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop. . . . At traffic check-
points the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can
see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be
frightened . . . by the intrusion.
This statement is a shining example of a prescriptive statement masquerading as a
descriptive observation. It is not only unsupported by any data on motorists' probable
reactions to roadblock stops versus roving patrol stops; as Justice Rehnquist observed in
his dissenting opinion in Prouse, quoted infra note 285, it is also contrary to common
sense. It seems highly likely that some travelers would be especially frightened by a
roadblock replete with blinking lights, numerous police officers and vehicles, pulled-
over cars, and spectators. It is hardly obvious that everyone will find these law enforce-
ment extravaganzas comforting. In other countries, such displays of police power are
the hallmark of authoritarian regimes. One state court that found all drunk driving
roadblocks per se unconstitutional stressed that the subjective intrusiveness, or "fear
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tive intrusiveness is whether individuals are taken by surprise, in which
case the search or seizure ranks high on the subjective intrusiveness
scale.155 The Court also has concluded that a search or seizure in public
is less subjectively intrusive than one in private."5 6
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the Court's fourth amend-
ment balancing approach is subject to serious criticism on several
grounds. 5 Most importantly, by attenuating the independent signifi-
cance of the fourth amendment's central probable cause requirement,
the balancing approach markedly diminishes fundamental, historically
rooted, fourth amendment protections.' Furthermore, the subjective
factor," was heightened by the presence of numerous police officers and other indicia of
authority. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
... United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.. 543, 559 (1976). This assumption
could be disputed. If, notwithstanding the forewarning, the motorist cannot avoid the
roadblock, the effect of the advance warning may very likely be to prolong and intensify
his anxiety, rather than to reduce it. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)
("anxiety" is an aspect of subjective intrusiveness). The Supreme Court seems to be
equating anxiety with surprise. But surely a court could take judicial notice that anxi-
ety can be caused by the dread of an anticipated, completely unsurprising event.
, ' Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560. This conclusion is also questionable. It is cer-
tainly plausible that at least some individuals would suffer greater embarrassment as a
result of a search or seizure conducted in public view than one conducted in private. See
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) ("embarrassment" is an aspect of
subjective intrusiveness). The Colorado Supreme Court recently observed that roadside
sobriety tests could be considered more subjectively intrusive than chemical testing for
blood alcohol content precisely because the latter usually takes place "in the relatively
obscure setting of a station house or hospital," whereas the former often takes place "on
or near a public street with the suspect exposed to the full view of , . . anyone else
who happens to be in the area." People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 317 (Colo. 1984).
"' For a classic critique of "interest balancing" in constitutional adjudication, see
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
" See supra text accompanying notes 31-33; see also Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 749 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (citations omitted) (third
and fourth brackets in original):
"[T]he [Fourth] Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most
[searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of
the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a [search]
is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable
cause.". . . Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substi-
tute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979) ("For all but .. narrowly
defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of prece-
dent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by
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intrusiveness concept, which is central to the balancing approach, is il-
logical and lacks empirical support.'59 By committing itself to this con-
cept, the Court overemphasizes the fourth amendment's purpose of lim-
iting arbitrary or discriminatory searches and seizures, while slighting
the amendment's equally important purpose of preventing unjustified
or unfounded searches and seizures. 60 The balancing approach also
does not fairly weigh the individual and societal interests actually im-
plicated by particular searches and seizures,' 6' and is subject to other
criticisms beyond the scope of this Article.'62 The key point for present
purposes is that, even assuming the appropriateness of the balancing
test, drunk driving roadblocks are of dubious constitutionality.
B. Balancing Analysis of Drunk Driving Roadblocks
Although the Supreme Court's balancing approach generally subjects
searches and seizures to less rigorous scrutiny than they would receive
under traditional fourth amendment analysis, it by no means results in
automatic approval. Delaware v. Prouse,63 a leading example of the
balancing analysis, illustrates this point. The Prouse Court invalidated
as unreasonable random suspicionless car stops to check for drivers' li-
censes and vehicle registrations. The Prouse rationale provides strong
probable cause."); see also infra text accompanying notes 279-88.
" See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
60 The Court's notion of subjective intrusiveness is disturbing not only because of its
unsubstantiated assumptions about what types of police interference will be intolerable
to the reasonable individual. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. More
fundamentally, the Court's emphasis on this concept is troublesome because it reflects a
limited view of the fourth amendment's guarantees. The Court's subjective intrusive-
ness concept turns upon judgments concerning equal protection and due process values
that are peripheral to the fourth amendment's central concern for limiting the role of
the police in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. See infra text accompanying notes
279-88. Rather than asking whether a challenged police practice infringes on citizens'
privacy and freedom, the Court asks whether the practice is implemented uniformly
and with advance notice. But, that a police practice might comport with equality and
procedural fairness concerns does not assure its consistency with fourth amendment
concerns. The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect individuals from Big
Brother's surveillance - regardless of whether the surveillance is uniform and overt,
and regardless of whether it has been preceded by advance notice.
l61 See supra note 136.
162 Another major defect in the balancing test, which Justice Brennan recently de-
scribed as "Rohrschach-like," is that it calls for subjective, ad hoc determinations. New
Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 752 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). It affords
policymakers and law enforcement agents scant guidance and encourages repetitive liti-
gation focusing upon the factual differences among generally similar situations.
-63 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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support for the conclusion that drunk driving roadblock stops are also
unreasonable. The random or "spot" checks at issue in Prouse were
designed to promote the very same "vital" societal interest in highway
safety as are drunk driving roadblocks. 6 ' Indeed, the Prouse decision
expressly recognized that one societal interest addressed by the chal-
lenged spot checks was "the apprehension of . . .drivers under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics.""'6 Notwithstanding the importance of
this governmental purpose, the Court invalidated the spot checks be-
cause the state had not satisfied its burden of proving that they were
sufficiently productive "[in terms of actually discovering" unlicensed or
intoxicated drivers "or deterring them from driving."'' 66 It is doubtful
that proponents of drunk driving roadblocks could satisfy this burden of
proof either.
1. The Productivity of Drunk Driving Roadblocks
Prouse makes clear that roadblock proponents would not prevail in
court merely by touting the gravity of the drunk driving problem and
averring, without specific proof, that roadblocks provide a solution. To
pass the fourth amendment balancing test, a challenged law enforce-
ment technique must be proved "a sufficiently productive mechanism to
justify the [resulting] intrusion on fourth amendment interests."'67 The
Prouse Court observed that no evidence demonstrated that the stops at
issue "substantially promoted" the state's interest in increasing high-
way safety, 68 or proved such stops to be "necessary."' 69 The Prouse
opinion repeatedly stressed the absence of empirical data to substantiate
the alleged effectiveness of these stops,'70 and noted that they merely
made "incremental" or "marginal" contributions to highway safety.' 7'
The Court concluded that, "given the alternative mechanisms available,
both those in use and those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced
that . . . spot check[s are justified] . . . under the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 2 Without citing any evidence, the Court declared that "[t]he
foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations .
164 Id. at 658.
65 Id. at 659 n.18.
Id. at 660.
567 Id. at 659.
568 Id. at 661.
569 Id. at 660.
,70 Id. at 659-61.
, Id. at 659, 661.
572 Id. at 659.
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is acting upon observed violations. 173 Finally, Prouse discounted the
spot checks' alleged deterrent effect, noting that no such effect was sub-
stantiated by empirical evidence."'
The burden of proof established by Prouse would be very difficult
for drunk driving roadblock proponents to satisfy. No convincing data
demonstrate that sobriety checkpoints "substantially promote,"'.7  much
less are "necessary" for,'76 highway safety. Moreover, there are "alter-
native mechanisms" for promoting this goal, including "[tihe foremost
method of acting upon observed violations."'77 There is only "mere as-
sertion," rather than convincing empirical evidence, to demonstrate that
drunk drivers "would not be deterred by the possibility of being in-
volved in a traffic violation or having some other experience" that
would subject them to a police officer's scrutiny, but that they "would
be deterred by the possibility" of being stopped at a roadblock.'78 For
these reasons, the Prouse conclusion that the spot check "does not ap-
pear sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement
practice under the Fourth Amendment"'7. applies with equal force to
sobriety checkpoints.
The unreasonableness of drunk driving roadblocks becomes even
clearer when the actual gravity of the drunk driving problem, the effi-
cacy of roadblocks, and the availability of less intrusive alternatives are
examined more closely. All of these considerations weigh against sobri-
ety checkpoints on both constitutional and policy grounds.
a. The Gravity of the Drunk Driving Problem
Many legislators, police officials, prosecutors, and judges apparently
have an image of drunk driving as a unique and ever-increasing prob-
lem that requires extraordinary countermeasures. 80 Too few policy-
173 Id.
"I, Id. at 660.
171 Id. at 661.
176 Id. at 660.
171 Id. at 659.
"I' Id. at 660.
179 Id.
180 For example, several Supreme Court opinions convey the view that drunk driving
is an enormous problem. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-59
(1983): "The situation underlying this case - that of the drunk driver - occurs with
tragic frequency on our Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is
well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court . . .has repeatedly
lamented the tragedy." The Neville opinion also cited statements from other Supreme
Court opinions that reflect this perspective. See id.
[Vol. 18:595
Drunk Driving Roadblocks
makers or courts examine the available information concerning either
the amount of drunk driving or the number of traffic deaths and inju-
ries, much less the number of deaths and injuries caused by drunk driv-
ers. While the personal and social costs of drunk driving should not be
minimized, they must be demystified and placed in proper perspective.
In evaluating drunk driving roadblocks, it is especially noteworthy that
only a small percentage of drivers are drunk at any given time and
place,181 and only a small subset of these drunk drivers are involved in
accidents causing death or injuries. 82 These figures underscore that, in
"'1 It is difficult to estimate the amount of drunk driving that occurs, even in a par-
ticular jurisdiction at a particular time of year, month, week, or day. To obtain the
most accurate results, one would need to stop all motorists at random times and places
and have them submit to blood or chemical tests for alcohol. It would be important not
to distort the results either by choosing roadways with particular kinds of drivers (for
example, college students, blue collar workers, or churchgoers), or by choosing unusual
times. Some studies have followed this model. The most famous is Professor
Borkenstein's Grand Rapids study in which drivers were randomly tested at sites where
accidents had occurred in the previous three years. Drivers were asked to provide
breath samples to the researchers voluntarily. Borkenstein's results show that only .75%
of all drivers who were tested had a blood alcohol content (BAC) at or above .10%,
which is the national standard for drunk driving. Another 2.47% had a BAC between
.05% and .09%. Ten percent of all drivers tested positively for the presence of any
alcohol at all. Borkenstein, Crowther, Shumate, Ziel & Zylman, The Role of the
Drinking Driver in Traffic Accidents (The Grand Rapids Study) (2d. ed.), in 2
BLUTALKOHOL: ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND BEHAVIOR 1, 66 (Supp. 1974) [hereafter
Borkenstein].
A higher proportion of drivers are intoxicated during the late night or early morning
weekend hours than at other times. A nationwide study conducted in 1973 by the Uni-
versity of Michigan's Highway Research Institute found that 3.2% of the drivers tested
between 10 and 12 p.m. had a BAC at or above .10%, and 6.3% had a BAC between
.05% and .09%. The period between 2 and 3 a.m. showed 11.1% of the drivers with a
BAC above .10% and 13.5% with a BAC from .05% to .09%. Wolfe, Characteristics of
Late-Night, Weekend Drivers: Results of the U.S. National Roadside Breath-Testing
Survey and Several Local Surveys, in I ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND TRAFFIC SAFETY,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS,
AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 41, 41-49 (S. Israelstam & S. Lambert eds. 1974).
Prior to implementing the federally sponsored Alcohol Safety Action Projects
(ASAP) in the early 1970's, 19 communities conducted nighttime random roadside
breath test surveys. Five and two-tenths percent (5.2%) of the drivers surveyed had a
BAC level over .10%. Voas, Results and Implications of the ASAPS, in 3 ALCOHOL,
DRUGS AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 1129, 1129-44 (L. Goldberg ed. 1981).
"I See J. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING, DRIVING
AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER (1981) (discussing how myths, such as "the killer drunk,"
have grown up around drunk driving, and how limited is the data base underlying
what the public and policymakers think they know about drunk driving); Zylman, A
Critical Evaluation of the Literature on "Alcohol Involvement" in Highway Deaths, 6
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an effort to detect and deter a small fraction of drivers, sobriety check-
points infringe the rights of vast numbers of innocent sober drivers.'83
Although the total number of lives lost or impaired in traffic acci-
dents is very high, fatal or serious accidents are statistically rare events
in light of the number of drivers and the amount of driving. The Na-
tional Safety Council reports a death rate of approximately 2.9 deaths
per one hundred million vehicle miles.' 4 Fatalities have steadily de-
clined over the past decade. 5 Indeed, the ratio of traffic deaths to pop-
ulation, miles driven, and licensed drivers has not increased over the
last five decades.'86 The Department of Transportation's figures for
1983 show 43,208 traffic deaths, the lowest level in twenty years. '
The traffic death rate in 1983 - 2.9 deaths per one hundred million
vehicle miles - was the lowest ever recorded. 88 These statistics should
dispel any notion that there is an unprecedented epidemic of traffic in-
juries or deaths.
Although drunk driving is a significant factor in traffic death and
injury tolls, the widely cited statistic that drunk drivers cause fifty per-
cent of all traffic fatalities8 9 is probably exaggerated. 9 ' In any case,
ACCIDENT ANNAL. & PREV. 163 (1974) (showing how the estimates of fatalities caused
by drunk driving have been systematically exaggerated); see also infra text accompany-
ing note 191.
"' These considerations should be weighed against the constitutionality of drunk
driving roadblocks in the Supreme Court's balancing analysis. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976): "In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized
that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context [vehicle stops and investigations of
motorists] also must take into account the overall degree of interference with legitimate
traffic." (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975)); see also
supra note 136.
114 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1983) [hereafter ACCIDENT
FACTS] (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review).
"1 Before drunk driving roadblocks were introduced in the 1980's, the number of
deaths per 100 million motor vehicle miles had long been declining. From 1971-81, the
number of deaths dropped 28%. The rate of decline from 1980-81 was 5%; from 1981-
82, it was 9%. Id. at 59.
186 Id.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
1983, at 21 (1984).
' ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 184, at 40. These figures increased slightly in
1984. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
1983, at 21 (1984).
"8 See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 2; Pro and Con:
Checkpoints to Catch Drunk Drivers?, 65 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 4, 1983,
at 65 (quoting New York City Police Commissioner Robert McGuire).
"' This figure is based upon data collected by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). Although FARS seeks
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drunk drivers are unlikely to cause more than a small number of deaths
or injuries over the course of a year in any particular area. For exam-
ple, a study supervised by Professor Herman Goldstein of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law School and Professor Charles Susmilch, a soci-
ologist, revealed that from 1975 to 1980, sixty-six persons were killed
in traffic accidents in Madison, Wisconsin, a city with a 250,000 popu-
lation, including a large number of college students. That is an average
of slightly over thirteen fatalities per year. Goldstein and Susmilch esti-
mated that no more than fifty-three percent of these fatalities could be
attributed to drunk drivers, yielding an average of 7.0 drunk driving
deaths per year. A more conservative estimate would attribute approxi-
mately thirty-six percent of the fatalities to at-fault drunk drivers, or
4.8 deaths per year.'91 Attempting to eliminate or reduce these 4.8-7.0
fatal accidents (and the larger number of serious accidents) each year
by stopping tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of motorists is akin to
the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack.
The majority of fatal accidents involving drunk drivers are single ve-
hicle crashes.'92 Because most of those who die in alcohol-related acci-
dents are drunk drivers, most alcohol-related traffic deaths more closely
resemble suicide than homicide. The existence of many sober victims
makes drunk driving a crime problem as well as a major public health
problem. However, drunk driving does not obviously outrank many
other types of injurious conduct that criminal laws seek to deter and
BAC test scores for drivers involved in all traffic fatalities, it has only been able to
obtain these scores for 36.6% of such drivers. Of this 36.6%, 42.5% had a BAC test
result greater than .10% (the nationwide standard for drunk driving). There is every
reason to believe that the 36.6% do not constitute a random sample of drivers involved
in fatal accidents, since the police would be more likely to administer BAC tests to
those drivers they suspected of intoxication. Therefore, the true percentage of traffic
fatalities caused by drunk drivers might well be much lower than 42.5%. NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM: 1980 (1981); see also Zylman, supra
note 182.
11, 2 H. GOLDSTEIN & C. SUSMILCH, THE DRINKING-DRIVER IN MADISON, A
STUDY OF THE PROBLEM AND THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE 13 (1982).
'92 For example, Goldstein and Susmilch found that between 1975 and 1980, only
6% of the people killed by drunk drivers were pedestrians or passengers in other cars,
while 62% of the people killed were the drunk drivers themselves, and 31% were pas-
sengers in drunk drivers' cars. Sober drivers killed more nondrinking drivers and
pedestrians than did drunk drivers. Id. at 17. These figures are consistent with data
demonstrating that driver deaths constitute a high percentage of all traffic fatalities. See
11 HIGHWAY & VEHICLE SAFETY REPORT 4 (Feb. 18, 1985) (preliminary study of
traffic fatalities for 1984 showed that 58% were drivers) (copy on file with U.C. Davis
Law Review).
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punish - mass murders, armed robbery, kidnapping, arson, child
abuse, and narcotics trafficking, to name a few. Thus, there is no more
reason to set aside our traditional social, political, and legal values to
fight drunk driving than to fight these other crimes.'"
b. The Efficacy of Drunk Driving Roadblocks
Proponents of drunk driving roadblocks exaggerate their efficacy in
reducing traffic carnage. Even their proponents recognize that the po-
tential effectiveness of drunk driving roadblocks does not lie in detecting
drunk drivers and removing them from the roads.'94 Sobriety check-
points produce very few drunk driving arrests.""5 Rather, advocates seek
" Decisionmakers would do well to recall Lord Camden's observation with respect
to the English common law tradition that "the mere need to solve crimes . . . did not
allow the law to place its own enforcement above all other values." J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-42 (1966). The powerful lan-
guage of Supreme Court cases such as the following oft-quoted passage in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (footnotes omitted), also bears serious
consideration:
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of
internal subversion, this basic law [the fourth amendment] and the values
it represents may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to some. But the
values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional con-
cepts. In times not altogether unlike our own they won . . . a right of
personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times
have changed, reducing everyman's scope to do as he pleases in an urban
and industrial world, the changes have made the values served by the
Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.
See also supra note 15 and infra text accompanying note 344.
114 For example, the police chief of Narragansett, Rhode Island, who first experi-
mented with drunk driving roadblocks in that state, has acknowledged that roadblocks
are not a particularly efficient way of apprehending drunk drivers. Fitzgerald, Road
Blocks Would Deter Drunk Driving, 2 Officialsfrom R.I. Tell U.S. Panel, Providence
J., Dec. 1, 1982, cited in AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RHODE ISLAND AFFILI-
ATE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH DRUNK DRIVING ROAD-
BLOCKS 3 (April 1983) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review); accord NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, THE USE OF SAFETY CHECKPOINTS FOR DWI ENFORCEMENT 2 (1983) (copy
on file with U.C. Davis Law Review) (emphasis in original): "[Drunk driving road-
blocks] . . . have not been proven cost effective when used solely for producing DWI
arrests, nor when they are used as the sole DWI enforcement technique."
' Although thousands of cars are stopped, only a few drunk driving arrests are
made. In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 2, 663 P.2d 992, 993
(1983) (Prager, J., dissenting), the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out that 5763 vehi-
cles were stopped at the drunk driving roadblocks under consideration, yet only 14
drivers were arrested for driving under the influence. Similarly, the dissenting opinion
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to justify them chiefly on the basis of an alleged deterrent effect 96 that
is speculative and probably unmeasurable.'97 First, they claim that ar-
restees at roadblocks will not only be removed from the road during
their processing, but will also be deterred from committing future viola-
tions. Second, roadblocks are said to exercise a general deterrent effect
on the entire population of drivers who encounter them. Regardless of
whether drivers -were drinking before passing through the roadblock,
they may leave it believing that the possibility of apprehension for
drunk driving is much higher than previously imagined. If that is true,
they may be less likely to drive while intoxicated in the future. Third,
it is claimed that drunk driving roadblocks may have a general deter-
rent effect on citizens who have not been stopped themselves, but who
have learned of the roadblocks through the media or by word of
in State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 544-46, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (1983), pointed out
that of the 2000-3000 motorists stopped at the drunk driving roadblock in question,
only 15 were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A DWI strike force
that operated sobriety checkpoints in Bergen County, New Jersey from May 31, 1983,
to October 30, 1983, reported that 17,824 motor vehicles were stopped, and that 276
DWI arrests were made. During its 22 weekends of operation, the strike force made
one DWI arrest for every 5.2 hours of enforcement. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 3 TRAFFIC
SAFETY EVALUATION RESEARCH REVIEW 5 (Nov.-Dec. 1984) (copy on file with U.C.
Davis Law Review) [hereafter TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION]. During the July 4,
1983, weekend the Massachusetts State Police maintained drunk driving roadblocks at
which 11,863 cars were stopped and 66 DWI arrests made. Id. at 5. The Delaware
State Police have reported that at the sobriety checkpoints which they conducted be-
tween December 1982 and September 1983, 14,412 vehicles were stopped and 264
alcohol-related arrests made. Id. at 8; see also infra text accompanying note 214.
196 See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY TASK FORCE, supra
note 4, at 9; NTSB STUDY, supra note 2.
97 Highly respected literature in the field of criminology indicates that most
criminals simply do not believe they will be caught, therefore rendering doubtful the
purported deterrent effect of severe criminal laws. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973). There is
no reason to believe that drunk drivers would be more likely than other criminals to
believe they will be caught. To the contrary, since they are drunk, there is every reason
to think these individuals might be particularly resistant to deterrence threats. The
limited attempts to determine whether sobriety checkpoints in fact have any deterrent
effect have not found one. For example, a recent study of the extent to which two
drunk driving roadblock programs changed public perceptions or behavior concerning
drunk driving found no deterrent effect. The study concluded: "Despite the high visibil-
ity and awareness of roadblocks, and evidence that they increase estimates of the likeli-
hood that drunk drivers will be picked up, the limited evidence from the self-reported
behavioral measures does not indicate that roadblocks have changed the drinking and
driving behavior of [survey] respondents . TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION, supra
note 195, at 17; see infra note 201.
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mouth. "'
Despite claims by police departments, government officials, anti-
drunk driving programs, and citizens' groups, 99 it has not been con-
vincingly demonstrated that drunk driving roadblocks have reduced
drunk driving in any jurisdiction,"' and the authors are unaware of
198 See Note, Roadblock Seizures, supra note 16, at 1458 n.3; see also supra note 4.
For example, during the year following Delaware's enactment of a strengthened
anti-drunk driving law, alcohol-related fatalities in that state dropped 23%. According
to Delaware Lieutenant Governor Michael Castle, "probably the single greatest deter-
rent effect has been the sobriety checkpoints run by the State Police." NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY NEWSLETTER, Oct.-
Dec. 1983, at 3 (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review). The Lieutenant Gover-
nor's conclusion is apparently impressionistic, and not based upon any empirical analy-
sis. The results he cited could be attributable to many factors, including changes in
police behavior. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
200 To the authors' knowledge, the only serious effort to evaluate the effectiveness of
drunk driving roadblocks was undertaken by the Maryland State Police. They imple-
mented roadblocks for a trial three-month period in Harford County. They then com-
pared the numbers of all accidents, alcohol-related accidents, and fatal accidents during
that period with corresponding statistics in the same county from the same period dur-
ing the previous year, and with the experience of a control county during these same
two time periods. The results are as follows:
Harford County Frederick County
Dec. - Feb. Dec. - Feb. Dec. - Feb. Dec. - Feb.
1981-1982 1982-1983 1981-1982 1982-1983
Total
Accidents 755 665 581 580
Percent
Increase/ -12% 0%
Decrease
Alcohol-
Related 133 120 108 96
Accidents
Percent
Increase/ -10% -11%
Decrease
Fatal
Accidents 3 8 10 3
Maryland State Police, Field Operations Bureau, Traffic Program Planning Unit, So-
briety Checkpoint Program Evaluation Report 10 (Apr. 20, 1983) (unpublished manu-
script) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review). As compared with the previous
year, total accidents in the test county declined more than in the control county. Never-
theless, taken as a whole, these figures show the roadblocks to have been ineffective.
At the outset, it should be noted that it is an error to attempt to determine whether a
particular public policy intervention has produced a change by looking at only two
points in time (before and after the change). To carry out "interrupted time series
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any serious research underway to test roadblocks' avowed efficacy; ad-
mittedly, such research would be very difficult to execute.2"'
Studies of other enforcement measures that have increased drunk
driving arrest rates have concluded that such measures do not reduce
either drunk driving or alcohol-related fatalities.0 2 There seems to be
analysis" properly requires many data points both before and after the policy interven-
tion, to determine whether there is a real break in a long-term trend, just a momentary
oscillation, or a regression to the mean. See H.L. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING
DRIVER 17 (1982).
Putting that fundamental problem aside, however, can we conclude that the 12%
drop in total accidents in Harford County (as compared with the 0% drop in total
accidents in the control county) is attributable to a deterrent effect generated by sobriety
checkpoints? The answer is clearly "no." An informed conclusion would require a
great deal more information about the accidents involved, including what kinds of acci-
dents they were, what time of the day or night they occurred, and whether they were
single- or multi-vehicle. The table reveals that for accidents coded as "alcohol-related"
(a designation leaving a great deal of room for discretion), the reduction in the test
county (-10%) is no greater than the reduction in the control county (-11%). One could
not conclude from those figures that the sobriety checkpoints had any effect on accident
reduction. Furthermore, the statistics on fatal accidents are adverse to the roadblock
cause: the test county experienced a 267% increase in fatal accidents (from 3 to 8),
whereas the control county experienced a decrease of more than 300% (from 10 to 3).
Despite these statistics (which we emphasize cannot be taken seriously because of the
lack of the large number of data points necessary for interrupted time series analysis),
the report concludes that: "In summary, the pilot program has demonstrated that sobri-
ety checkpoints have the potential to reduce motor vehicle accidents in the area where
they are utilized." Sobriety Checkpoint Program Evaluation Report, supra, at 15. Ac-
cordingly, the Report recommended "[sitatewide implementation of sobriety checkpoints
on a highly selective basis." Id. The Maryland State Police's drunk driving roadblock
program was upheld by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984).
o' It would be extremely difficult to test the marginal deterrent effect of drunk driv-
ing roadblocks. One might try to measure the blood alcohol levels of all drivers (or a
random sample of drivers) on a particular road on several occasions before and after the
implementation of a roadblock program, but that would be expensive and entail legal
problems. See Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984). Assuming this
testing could be done, any decrease in drunk drivers would constitute the marginal
deterrent effect of the police initiative, unless other developments (such as stricter laws)
during the same period were responsible for the change. This research would be prob-
lematic not only due to the difficulty of controlling for other change agents, but also
because there are only a very small number of serious crashes on any one road in a
year.
202 Professor H. Laurence Ross, the foremost evaluator of drunk driving countermea-
sures, has concluded that efforts to reduce drunk driving through increasing the
probability of arrest and severity of punishment have not been successful. H.L. Ross,
supra note 200, at 102-04. His research shows that even when crackdowns produce a
short-term decrease in drunk driving, normal patterns reappear after a relatively brief
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no correlation between the number or rate of drunk driving arrests in a
jurisdiction and the increase or decrease in fatal accidents, especially if
one considers only single vehicle nighttime fatalities, those most likely
to involve alcohol.20 3
Supporters of drunk driving roadblocks cite reported decreases in fa-
talities in jurisdictions that have used such roadblocks. Most of these
reports are highly unreliable, based upon unpublished and unsubstanti-
ated claims by agencies entrusted with the job of combating drunk driv-
ing and anxious to demonstrate success. 204 Even if they were accurate,
these statistics do not demonstrate the efficacy of the roadblocks for sev-
eral reasons. First, drunk driving roadblocks are usually implemented
simultaneously with other new anti-drunk driving initiatives. Conse-
quently, any decline in the incidence of drunk driving could be due to
any one of these other measures.0 5
period. Id. at 105; accord Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of
Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 453 (1969); Ennis, General Deterrence and Police
Enforcement: Effective Countermeasures Against Drinking and Driving?, 9 J. SAFETY
RESEARCH 15, 22-23 (1977); Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1660, 1681 (1981).
Similarly, although the federal government's Alcohol Safety Action Projects (ASAP),
implemented in 32 counties between 1972 and 1976, resulted in substantially increased
drunk driving arrests in some communities, they produced no discernible reduction in
alcohol-related fatalities. Nichols, Weinstein, Ellingstad & Struckman-Jo, The Specific
Deterrent Effect of ASAP Education and Rehabilitation Programs, 10 J. SAFETY RE-
SEARCH 177, 185 (1978) (little deterrent effect); see also Zylman, Mass Arrests for
Impaired Driving May Not Prevent Fatal Crashes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND TRAFFIC SAFETY, ADDIC-
TION RESEARCH FOUNDATION 225 (1970). In 1974, the Insurance Institute of High-
way Safety compared year to year variations in highway crash fatality patterns in 28
ASAP locations with those in comparable non-ASAP locations, both before and during
ASAP's operational period. Institute researchers found no reductions in fatalities
unique to the ASAP areas. They observed that, "in the absence of any evidence of an
overall reduction in fatalities, it is only possible to conclude scientifically that ASAPs,
as large scale social programs, have been ineffective." INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY, 16 STATUS REPORT, Apr. 16, 1981, at 7 (copy on file with U.C.
Davis Law Review).
23 See Waller, King, Nielson & Turkel, Alcohol and Other Factors in California
Highway Fatalities, 14 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 429, 432 (1969).
204 See supra note 199.
205 Other drunk driving countermeasures that have been implemented contemporane-
ously with sobriety checkpoints include raising the drinking age, imposing mandatory
minimum jail sentences, restricting plea bargaining, and establishing a certain blood
alcohol content as conclusive proof of guilt. Even the National Transportation Safety
Board, which advocates drunk driving roadblocks, recognizes that "studies to isolate the
impact of [drunk driving roadblocks] alone are difficult to accomplish because other
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Second, any reduction may be the natural continuation of a long-
term downward trend or the regression to the mean after a brief in-
crease that temporarily interrupts a long-term downward trend. The
rate of fatal driving accidents per mile driven has been declining since
the advent of the automobile." 6 Furthermore, the total number of traf-
fic fatalities has declined by almost twenty percent since its peak in the
early 1970's.207 No one knows to what extent the decline in traffic fatal-
ities is due to better driving, safer cars, advances in emergency medical
care, lower speed limits, improvements in roads, signs or lights, or
other factors.
Third, even assuming that drunk driving roadblocks initially de-
creased drunk driving, this effect would probably diminish as drinking
drivers became accustomed to roadblocks, learned where they were
likely to be located, and realized that the possibility of being arrested
remained low. Thus, over time, drunk driving roadblocks would not
significantly increase the likelihood - or, more importantly, the per-
ception of the likelihood - that a drunk driver would be caught. To
the extent that drinking drivers react to roadblocks by driving on less
safe backroads, where roadblocks cannot be effectively implemented,
any deterrent effect would be offset by a displacement effect that could,
ironically, increase drunk driving accidents." 8 Indeed, available statis-
tics indicate that even when the implementation of drunk driving road-
blocks and other anti-drunk driving measures is followed by an initial
decline in drinking and driving, this trend is soon reversed.0 9
[drunk driving] countermeasures, associated publicity, and myriad environmental fac-
tors combine to affect crash levels." NTSB STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.
"I' ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 184, at 59.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 194 (police chief who first instituted drunk driv-
ing roadblocks in Rhode Island commented that they probably caused drivers to shift
their drinking activities to other communities where risk of being stopped was not per-
ceived to be great).
209 The typical pattern is for the initial effect of an anti-drunk driving strategy, if
any, to dissipate steadily over time. In several states that took strict action against
drunk drivers in 1981 or 1982, early reductions in deaths and accidents inyolving such
drivers have slowed or even reversed. For example, in Maine, after a law to attain
higher rates of arrest, conviction, and punishment took effect in September 1981, the
number of fatalities fell from 261 in 1980 to 211 in 1981, and to 166 in 1982. How-
ever, in 1983, the number of fatalities rose to 222. In Maryland, after several drunk
driving countermeasures took effect in 1981, traffic deaths decreased from 792 in 1981
to 660 in 1982. However, the figure for 1983 remained at 660. Drunk Driving Toll is
Down, but Fears Remain, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1984, at A17, col. 1. Without careful
study, it is not possible to say whether a drop in fatalities in a particular year is a real
decrease, or simply a regression to the mean. See supra note 200. In other words, the
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Finally, even if drunk driving roadblocks did decrease drunk driving,
fatal and serious accidents would not necessarily decline, at least not at
the same rate as drunk driving." ' The most intractable drunk drivers
are, by definition, the ones least concerned about apprehension and
punishment. Many may be binge drinkers, thrill seekers, depressives,
or suicidal or anti-social personalities.2 ' Notwithstanding any positive
impact that roadblocks might have in deterring some people's future
drinking-driving behavior, they might well have no influence on this
type of driver. Unfortunately, we know very little about different types
of drunk drivers and the natural history of fatal crashes, making pre-
high fatality year may well have been aberrational, and what looks like a decrease
achieved through sound policy intervention may only be a return to normal levels.
Professor Ross found that in European countries that undertook serious efforts to
combat drunk driving in the late 1960's and early 1970's, initial reductions were fol-
lowed by relatively quick returns to previous levels. H.L. Ross, supra note 200, at 24-
48. This phenomenon is illustrated by the British experience under the 1967 Road
Safety Act, which empowered the police to require a breath test of any driver and
deemed a driver's refusal to take the test a failure. Just as with drunk driving road-
blocks, this British law aimed exclusively at increasing the certainty-of apprehending
drunk drivers (rather than increasing the certainty or severity of punishment). Immedi-
ately after the 1967 Road Safety Act went into effect, weekend traffic fatalities and
serious injuries dropped to one-third of their previous levels. However, this effect grad-
ually wore off, and within three years, fatalities had returned to their previous levels.
Id. at 31.
210 There is no hard evidence that roadblocks affect highway fatalities. The one
roadblock whose impact has been analyzed with some, albeit insufficient, care had no
positive impact on highway fatalities. See Table 1, supra note 200. An analysis of
accident trends issued by New York's STOP-DWI program noted a 15.1% decline in
fatal automobile accidents in 1982 (before sobriety checkpoints were implemented in
New York) as compared to the previous three-year period, while all accidents declined
by only 1.8%. The decline was attributed to a higher rate of unemployment (which was
considered at least possibly related to the number of miles driven), an increase in seat
belt usage, and improved emergency medical response, as well as harsher DWI laws.
OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, ACCIDENT TRENDS SINCE
INITIATION OF THE SPECIAL TRAFFIC OPTIONS PROGRAM FOR DRIVING WHILE IN-
TOXICATED 4, 8, 10, 19 (1983) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review).
2" The prominent Scandinavian criminologist Johannes Andaneas recently came to
this conclusion:
Motorists with very high BAC levels, and therefore representing a high
risk factor in traffic, more often than not are persons with serious alcohol
problems, often aggravated by other social shortcomings. These people are
poor targets for the deterrent and moral effect of the law.
Andaneas, Drinking-and Driving-Laws in Scandinavia, in SCANDINAVIAN STUD-
IES IN LAW 13, 21 (1984). On suicide and drunk driving, see N. TABACHNICK, ACCI-
DENT OR SUICIDE; DESTRUCTION BY AUTOMOBILE (1973).
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dictions concerning the efficacy of roadblocks all the more speculative.
c. The Availability of Less Intrusive Anti-Drunk Driving
Measures
Claims concerning the need for drunk driving roadblocks are flawed
for another reason. Other law enforcement and non-law enforcement
strategies not only constitute potentially effective countermeasures, but
also can be implemented without impinging on fourth amendment in-
terests. In the absence of any data demonstrating the superiority of
roadblocks, both policymakers and judges should prefer less intrusive
countermeasures.
212
As even proponents of drunk driving roadblocks have acknowl-
edged, 213 roadblocks do not produce many arrests for drunk driving,
and are not, in that respect, demonstrably superior to other law en-
forcement techniques. For example, of 1,107,945 people stopped at
drunk driving roadblocks conducted in New York City in the past two
years, only 4823 - slightly more than four tenths of one percent -
were arrested for drunk driving. 214 Police officers patrolling on roads
selected because of the high incidence of drinking and driving, or of-
ficers stationed near bars and taverns at carefully chosen times, would
probably make at least as many drunk driving arrests per officer hour
as officers stationed at drunk driving roadblocks. The traditional patrol
approach, where police officers arrest drivers whose observed erratic
driving behavior creates probable cause, produces close to two million
215arrests per year. To increase the deterrent effect of arrests made by
officers on roving patrol, the police can implement periodic crackdowns
with great fanfare. Deployment of police officers on patrol can also
create the appearance of heightened police presence, since drivers can
never be sure whether and where they will encounter a patrol car. As-
signing officers to patrol duty has the added advantage that they can
simultaneously enforce other laws.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975) (invali-
dating Border Patrol practice of randomly stopping vehicles, without individualized
suspicion, to seek illegal aliens): "[Tlhe nature of illegal alien traffic . . . tend[s] to
generate articulable grounds for identifying violators. Consequently, a requirement of
reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding the
public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from indiscriminate offi-
cial interference." Id. at 883; see also supra text accompanying notes 143-45 & 172.
213 See supra note 194.
214 Telephone interview with Lanie Kirschner, New York Department of Transpor-
tation (Apr. 15, 1985); see also supra note 195.
21 FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 64, at 170 (Table 23).
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In light of the unimpressive arrest record of sobriety checkpoints,
their proponents' major claim is that they produce more general deter-
rence per hour of police effort than roving patrols. 16 Yet this assertion
is also unsubstantiated by reliable empirical research. How many po-
tential drunk drivers will be deterred by ten police officers working
eight hours at a sobriety checkpoint? How does that number compare
with the number who would be deterred by ten officers deployed on
aggressive, strategically located and timed roving patrols, or stationed in
front of busy taverns on main roads, seeking drivers whom they have
probable cause to believe are intoxicated? No one knows. 17
Even assuming that heightened public perception of the arrest risk
for drunk driving had a general deterrent effect, 18 other strategies that
are consistent with fourth amendment values could achieve this re-
216 See Note, Roadblock Seizures, supra note 16, at 1458 n.3.
2,7 Not surprisingly, the courts that have insisted upon empirical evidence to support
the efficacy of drunk driving roadblocks, vis-a-vis alternative countermeasures based
upon probable cause, have invalidated roadblocks. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v.
Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); State v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App.
3d 575, 578, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1984); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125,
1138 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("[Wle are . . . without information whether the con-
centration of seven police officers for one hour at this roadblock on an out-of-town road
is a more effective means of identifying and apprehending drunk drivers than having
those officers patrol roads nearer the places where drivers are likely to be drinking.");
see also State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (1983) (Prager, J.,
dissenting):
[T]he roadblock was in effect for. . . four hours . . . [and] between 2,000
and 3,000 motor vehicles were stopped at [it]. A total of 74 violations were
discovered . . . only 15 of which were for driving while intoxicated. Dur-
ing this period . . . 35 police officers were on duty, which . . . involved a
total of 140 man hours . . . . [I]t was not unreasonable . . . to assume
that the same or greater productivity in arresting drunk drivers could have
been achieved by distributing the 35 officers . . . throughout the city for
the sole purpose of observing erratic driving and stopping and checking
drunk drivers.
Even a court that upheld a sobriety checkpoint suggested that roving patrols might be
more efficient. Idaho v. Baker, No. 24-6699-82, slip op. at 8 (Idaho Magis. Ct. May
11, 1983).
2 8 Just as the authors believe that drunk driving roadblocks should not be accepted
without scrutiny, they also believe that alternative drunk driving countermeasures
should be carefully examined from both a legal and a policy perspective. See, e.g.,
supra note 197 (questioning deterrent effect of criminal laws upon drunk drivers). In
suggesting a range of possible alternatives, no endorsement of any or all is intended.
Rather, the authors stress that drunk driving roadblocks cannot fairly be viewed as the
only available method for effectively addressing the drunk driving problem.
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suit.2t 9 General deterrence could be promoted by increasing administra-
tive penalties, such as license suspension or revocation, and the severity
of criminal punishments. For example, some states have pursued in-
creased conviction rates (which are already very high)22 and severity of
punishments through measures establishing a certain blood alcohol
level as conclusive proof of guilt, making plea bargaining more difficult,
and imposing mandatory minimum jail sentences.22" ' General deterrence
could also be fostered by the imposition of nontraditional punishments;
one possibility is the forfeiture or impoundment of the drunk driver's
vehicle.222 Another type of drunk driving countermeasure is a higher
minimum age for drinking or driving.223
29 Government agencies could post signs and make radio and television broadcasts
warning that aggressive roving patrols are looking for evidence of drunk driving, and
that the drivers they arrest will be vigorously prosecuted. Police cars could "sit on"
roadside taverns, and decoy cars could be placed along roadsides. Special police cadets,
perhaps even volunteers, could be enlisted in the effort to observe and arrest drunk
drivers. Another alternative would be to station police officers at certain "natural road-
blocks," such as tollbooths, where drivers stop or slow down, thus facilitating observa-
tions as to their appearance and behavior. Tollbooth attendants also could be trained to
detect drunk drivers.
220 See Little, An Empirical Description of Administration of Justice in Drunk
Driving Cases, 7 LAW & SoC'v REV. 476 (1973) (58.5% of apprehended DWI offend-
ers convicted as charged and 89.2% convicted on either original charge or reduced
charge; DWI cases have close to 90% overall conviction rate, which is higher than that
for any other offense, including public drunkenness); see also supra note 67. The
Madison, Wisconsin study by Goldstein and Susmilch found that "of all arrests made
for DWI in March 1980 . . . 88% of the persons charged with DWI were convicted of
that charge . . . none of the arrests in our sample led to an acquittal." 2 H. GOLD-
STEIN & C. SUSMILCH, supra note 191, at 71.
22 For example, a law that became effective in California in January 1982 made
plea bargaining much more difficult. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23200(a) (West Supp. 1985).
This law established a .10% blood alcohol content as conclusive proof of guilt, id.
§ 23155(a)(3), and toughened punishments for drunk driving, see, e.g., id. § 23200(a).
222 California is one jurisdiction that has implemented impoundment as a counter-
measure. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23195 (West Supp. 1985). Regulations under the
Highway Safety Act of 1966 as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 408 (1982), also require im-
poundment of a driver's car if his license is suspended or revoked for an alcohol-related
offense. 23 C.F.R. § 1309.6(b)(18) (1984).
223 A new federal law denies some federal highway funds to states that do not enact a
minimum drinking age of 21 by September 30, 1986. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). In 1984,
four states - Massachusetts, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Tennessee - raised the
minimum drinking age to 21. Measures raising the drinking age to 21 will be under
review by 24 of the 26 states that now allow alcohol purchases by younger residents. 2
HIGHWAY & VEHICLE SAFETY REPORT 4 (Jan. 21, 1985) (copy on file with U.C.
Davis Law Review).
States with increased minimum drinking ages seem to show lower accident rates for
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Because drunk driving is a complex social problem, deeply rooted in
our culture, some experts believe that it cannot be dealt with effectively
through roadblocks or any other law enforcement approach.224 Experi-
ence in other countries with more extended histories of attempting to
reduce drunk driving suggests that this problem needs to be addressed
outside the criminal justice system.225 Some analysts urge that resources
should be channeled into public education programs to reinforce the
image of drunk driving as dangerous and irresponsible.226 Public educa-
younger drivers. For an empirical study on the relationship of drinking age and
alcohol-related traffic casualties, see A. WAGENAAR, ALCOHOL, YOUNG DRIVERS, AND
TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 53 (1983) (results revealed significant reductions in alcohol-
related crashes involving young drivers after increases in legal drinking age); see also
Williams, Zador, Harris & Karpf, The Effect of Raising the Legal Minimum Drinking
Age on Involvement in Fatal Crashes, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 178 (1983) (emphasis
in original):
When states lowered their legal drinking ages in the early 1970s, the re-
sult, for both law-affected and younger drivers, was an increased involve-
ment in fatal crashes, especially those crashes in which alcohol is most
often involved. The results of the present study indicate that when states
raise the drinking age, there is a corresponding decrease in fatal crashes
among law-affected drivers.
224 Professor Robert Force has proposed that drunk driving be altogether decriminal-
ized. R. Force, The Inadequacy of Drinking-Driving Laws: A Lawyer's View, in PRO-
CEEDINGS, SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND
TRAFFIC SAFETY 438, 441-42 (1979). As part of its sustained, multi-faceted campaign
to reduce the drunk driving problem, the National Association of Independent Insurers
advocates that first-time drunk driving offenses, not involving bodily injury, be handled
on an administrative basis. See NAIl to Launch Attack on Drunk Driving Problem, 31
UNDERWRITER'S REPORT, Aug. 5, 1982, at I (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Re-
view). Goldstein and Susmilch suggest the following alternative strategies: monitoring
those drivers whose behavior poses a continuing danger; increasing control over the
provision of alcohol to those who subsequently drive; and educating the community
about the drunk driving problem. H. GOLDSTEIN & C. SUSMILCH, supra note 191, at
168, 179, 185.
22 For example, Professor Ross's exhaustive studies of law enforcement strategies
aimed at reducing drunk driving in Europe and the United States have convinced him
that significant long-term reductions cannot be achieved through the criminal justice
system. Instead, he suggests raising the drinking age and 'developing crash-proof cars.
H.L. Ross, supra note 200, at 114.
226 The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving recommended that the media,
clergy, and medical communities help develop new social norms to inhibit drunk driv-
ing. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8. This is easier said
than done. See generally Horchheimer, Reducing Alcohol Abuse: A Critical Review of
Enforcement Strategies, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALCOHOL & PUBLIC POL-
ICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 286-335 (1981); H. Blane & L. Hewitt,
Mass Media, Public Education and Alcohol: A State of the Art Review, Final Report
Prepared for National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and
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tion campaigns can also attempt to change the behavior of those in a
position to prevent drunk driving - the driver's family and friends,
tavern owners, and social hosts.
Possibly the most effective strategy for reducing highway carnage -
whether caused by drunk driving, other forms of incompetent and irre-
sponsible driving, defective vehicles, or poorly marked or designed road-
ways - is to require that all passenger cars be equipped with passive
restraint systems, preferably airbags. This safety innovation would save
thousands of lives annually.. 7 without having to depend upon changing
the intractable social attitudes or life patterns of millions of drivers,
some of whom are immature, irresponsible, and self destructive.
2. The Intrusiveness of Drunk Driving Roadblock Investigations
As the preceding section demonstrates, drunk driving roadblock in-
vestigations could be found unconstitutionally unreasonable under the
Prouse analysis because their advocates cannot carry the burden of sub-
stantiating their avowed effectiveness. This section shows that drunk
driving roadblock investigations could also be found to fail the Prouse
reasonableness test because they are more intrusive than roadblock in-
vestigations aimed at enforcing license-registration requirements (as
well as the four other types of suspicionless searches that the Supreme
Court has authorized) in both objective and subjective terms. 8
Mental Health Admin., Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Feb. 1977)
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review).
227 Air bag operation is described in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2862 (1983):
The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the dashboard and steering
column. It automatically inflates when a sensor indicates that deceleration
forces from an accident have exceeded a preset minimum, then rapidly
deflates to dissipate those forces. The life saving potential of these devices
was immediately recognized, and in 1977, after substantial on-the-road
experience . . . it was estimated by NHTSA that passive restraints could
prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 100,000 serious injuries
annually.
A 1980 NHTSA Report reduced the predicted number of lives that airbags save annu-
ally to 9000. Id. at 2864.
228 This conclusion is underscored by a recent Arizona Supreme Court decision that
invalidated a drunk driving roadblock using a balancing analysis. The Court concluded
that the state had used the "subterfuge" of asserting that the purpose of the roadblock
was to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations, and that drunk driving enforce-
ment should be "an incidental beneficiary." State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136
Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983). Clearly, in the view of both the state and the
court, drunk driving roadblocks are constitutionally more vulnerable than are license-
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a. Objective Intrusiveness
Drunk driving roadblock investigations are more objectively intrusive
than the suspicionless searches and seizures that the Supreme Court
has approved. The initial investigation at a drunk driving roadblock is
personal, involving a police officer's inspecting, smelling, questioning,
and perhaps coordination testing of the driver. Those drivers detained
after the initial investigation are subjected to progressively more intru-
sive investigations. In contrast, the investigation at a license-registration
roadblock is inherently limited and nonpersonal; whether a driver pos-
sesses certain specific documents can be promptly and objectively deter-
mined without inspecting the driver's body or conduct. 2 9 The purpose
of a drunk driving roadblock investigation - to assess whether a driver
is intoxicated - requires a subjective evaluation of the driver's per-
sonal attributes and behavior that cannot be so promptly or accurately
accomplished.230
The opportunity to utilize drunk driving roadblocks for law enforce-
ment purposes other than to counter the drunk driving problem will
magnify their objective intrusiveness."' Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions markedly expand the search and seizure options available when-
ever a police officer has lawfully stopped a car. Pursuant to a valid
vehicle stop, the officer may seize any weapons, drugs, or other "fruits
registration roadblocks.
229 Similarly, the purpose of a Border Patrol stop - to ascertain whether any aliens
lack proper documentation - should generally be capable of relatively prompt and
objective determination through a " 'response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.' " United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (quoting Brief for United States at
25).
230 See supra text accompanying note 65.
232 Like all discretionary police power, the power to conduct roadblock investigations
can be exercised in an invidiously discriminatory fashion. As Professor Amsterdam has
noted, "[t]he dangers of abuse of a particular power are, certainly, a pertinent consider-
ation in determining whether the power should be allowed in the first instance."
Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 435. Significantly, he stressed that
A . .. compelling case can be made, obviously, for the rule that motor-
vehicle stoppings without probable cause are altogether impermissible be-
cause the danger of abuse of the license-check pretext far outweighs the
need of the police to apprehend unlicensed drivers not observed to be vio-
lating other traffic laws or driving unsafely.
Id. at 436; accord United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (in
explaining why Brignoni-Ponce decision had invalidated discretionary suspicionless car
stops and investigations by Border Patrol, Court noted that "[tihere also was a grave
danger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in the
field").
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or instrumentalities" of crime that are in "plain view" inside the car.232
The officer may also ask the driver to produce a driver's license and
vehicle registration, and may shine a flashlight into the car to observe
the driver and the car's interior. 33 If, as is usually the case, the driver
opens the glove compartment to look for the vehicle's registration, the
officer may adjust his body position specifically to obtain a better view
of the glove compartment's contents.23 ' If the officer sees any fruits or
instrumentalities of crime in the glove compartment, he may seize them
under the plain view doctrine. 3 The Supreme Court has recently indi-
cated that if, during a lawful automobile stop, a police officer smells
alcohol or drugs, he may seize them and arrest the driver pursuant to
the "plain odor" doctrine.236
Additionally, the Court has held that, following any lawful vehicle
stop, the police officer may direct the driver to get out of the car, even
without reason to suspect the driver of a crime.237 If the officer notices a
bulge under the driver's clothing, the driver may be frisked for weap-
ons. 38 If the officer reasonably suspects that the driver is dangerous, he
may conduct a warrantless search of the ehicle's interior, including the
glove compartment (and perhaps also the trunk), before allowing the
driver to reenter and proceed.239
232 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
233 See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion).
234 Id. at 740; see also People v. Vasquez, 36 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2290 (N.Y.
App. Div. Dec. 20, 1984) (police officer who stopped automobile because of its dan-
gling license plate was entitled to lean into car to speak to passenger, look around, and
seize pistol he saw lying in plain view on floorboard, even though officer did not sus-
pect that driver or his passenger posed any danger to him).
23 Brown, 460 U.S. at 740.
23 Although the issue was not presented to the Court in United States v. Johns, 105
S. Ct. 881, 886 (1985), the Court observed in dictum that "[w]hether [defendants] ever
had a privacy interest in the packages reeking of marijuana is debatable."
237 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). A recent Colorado Supreme Court
decision extended Mimms by upholding an officer's order to a driver, who had been
stopped for a traffic violation, to get out of the car and walk to its rear. People v.
Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 315-16 (Colo. 1984). Carlson further held that the plain view
doctrine authorized the officer's observation of the defendant's gait and furnished rea-
sonable suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. How-
ever, it ruled that field sobriety tests could not be administered absent probable cause or
voluntary consent.
23 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106, 111-12.
239 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480 (1983). The Supreme Court remanded
to the Michigan Supreme Court to determine whether the trunk search was permissible
under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), or other authority. The
Michigan Supreme Court had not previously reached this issue. Long, 103 S. Ct. at
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If a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains
contraband, he may conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle
and all its contents, including the contents of any closed container in the
passenger compartment or trunk.240 The police officer may take the ve-
hicle to the station and conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehi-
cle and its contents,2 ' and he may place closed containers that were
inside the car into storage facilities, returning days later to conduct
warrantless searches of them.242
If routine suspicionless stops are permitted at drunk driving road-
blocks, thousands of ordinary unsuspected citizens would be subject to
the expansive investigations authorized by the decisions summarized
above. These search and seizure doctrines provide police officers with
powerful temptations to exploit drunk driving roadblock stops to carry
out general law enforcement "check-ups." '243 Indeed, at virtually every
drunk driving roadblock for which arrest data are available, there have
been substantially more arrests or summonses for offenses other than
drunk driving.24 ' If the police are given permission to stop vehicles at
sobriety checkpoints, and to make limited observations and inquiries,
more far-ranging investigations will inevitably follow. Therefore, the
purportedly minimal intrusion occasioned by the initial stop and inves-
tigation cannot realistically be regarded as the only invasion of individ-
ual rights to be weighed in the balancing test; in many, if not all, in-
3474 n.3.
240 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
241 Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.
242 United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881, 887 (1985).
243 The Arkansas State Police recently operated a "saturation enforcement road-
block," aimed at "makling] many arrests for offenses ranging from DWI, Wanted Per-
sons, Stolen Trucks and Cars, Drugs and Narcotics, and so forth," at which narcotics
officers moved up and down the lines of waiting vehicles with dogs trained to sniff
narcotics. Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106, 113 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
24, For example, a DWI strike force operating sobriety checkpoints in Bergen
County, New Jersey from May 31, 1983, to October 30, 1983, reported that 17,824
motor vehicles were stopped, 276 DWI arrests were made, 275 moving violations were
ticketed, 508 other violators were ticketed, and 72 other criminal arrests were made.
TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION, supra note 195, at 5. See also State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (Prager, J., dissenting) (of 2000-3000 motorists
stopped during four-hour roadblock in Topeka, Kansas, 15 arrested for drunk driving,
and 59 charged with other offenses). But see TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION, supra
note 195, at 5 (during weekend of July 4, 1983, Massachusetts State Police maintained
drunk driving roadblocks at which 11,863 cars were stopped and total of 81 arrests
made, of which 66 were for "operating under the influence").
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stances, the objective intrusiveness is significantly greater." '
b. Subjective Intrusiveness
The subjective intrusiveness of a search or seizure depends in sub-
stantial part on the extent to which people value privacy in the setting
in which it occurs.2"6 For example, because people almost always seek
to maintain the privacy of their homes, it is assumed that any house
search is very subjectively intrusive." 7 At the other end of the spectrum,
because managers of commercial enterprises open to the public gener-
ally do not seek to maintain privacy, it is assumed that the subjective
intrusiveness of such searches is relatively slight.2"'
Although a car is not an entirely private domain, it constitutes an
245 A policymaker evaluating sobriety checkpoints should clearly consider the full
scope of investigations likely to occur at such checkpoints. However, what a reviewing
court should consider in evaluating the objective intrusiveness of any particular investi-
gation under the fourth amendment balancing test is a more complicated issue, one
which the Supreme Court has not directly addressed. A reviewing court should assign a
weight to the societal interests that it determines drunk driving roadblocks to promote,
and then determine the amount of intrusiveness that would be permissible. The court
could find that the pertinent countervailing societal interests permit no intrusion what-
soever on individual privacy, freedom, and security. Alternatively, it could conclude that
they permit only the initial stop and a very limited investigation; in that case, any
further investigation would demand independent justification, such as reasonable suspi-
cion, probable cause, or the motorist's consent. If a court upholds any portion of a
drunk driving roadblock investigation without individualized suspicion under a balanc-
ing approach, it must find that the intrusiveness entailed in that portion of the investi-
gation is outweighed by its promotion of countervailing societal interests. In other
words, unless the court holds that a portion of the drunk driving roadblock investigation
is justified on independent grounds, such as development of facts supporting reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, it can only sustain the investigation if it finds that the
intrusiveness of the entire investigation was outweighed by the countervailing societal
interests.
26 In its seminal decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the
Supreme Court repudiated the notion that certain areas are protected by the fourth
amendment while others are not, because "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." The Court explained that the fourth amendment generally protects whatever
the individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public."
Id.
247 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (referring
to "the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection").
248 See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) ("The greater latitude
to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the ex-
pectation of privacy . . . in such property differs significantly from the sanctity ac-
corded an individual's home .. ").
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intermediate case between the private home and the commercial enter-
prise.249 City planners and transportation experts find that commuters
and other travelers will endure numerous inconveniences and delays to
enjoy the privacy and autonomy afforded by their automobiles as com-
pared to the forced intimacy of buses and trains.25 In our modern soci-
ety, driving has the same social and psychological significance that
walking had for previous generations."' People sometimes drive to es-
cape the demands of job and home, to carry on intimate conversations,
or simply to think. Being in a private car, especially late at night, when
sobriety checkpoints are almost always operated,252 is far different from
being out in public. A vehicle occupant may not wish to be seen in a
particular locale, in particular clothing, or with a particular compan-
ion. In short, an individual has a substantial interest in freely and pri-
vately operating a vehicle on the roadways that is worthy of serious
consideration and respect.
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that, because of an au-
tomobile traveler's substantial expectations of privacy and security,
wide-scale governmental interference with such travel would contravene
the fourth amendment.253 The Supreme Court also has expressly recog-
"' See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) ("The word 'automo-
bile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away. ... .");
see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing probable cause requirement
for automobile searches and seizures) & note 75 (distinguishing cars from facilities of
pervasively regulated businesses subject to searches without probable cause).
"I See J. MEYER & J. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, AUTOS, TRANSIT, AND CITIES: A TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY FUND REPORT 277-78 (1981).
.s, For a paean to walking and related activities, as "historically part of the ameni-
ties of life . . . [that] have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence . . . [and] have encouraged lives of high spirits," see
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 & nn.6-7 (1972) (unanimously
reversing convictions under vagrancy ordinance that levied criminal penalties on, among
others, "common night walkers" and "persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose or object," and holding ordinance void for
vagueness).
252 A court could take judicial notice that being stopped and investigated by a police
officer at night is generally more frightening, and hence more subjectively intrusive,
than being stopped and investigated during the daytime. For this reason also, drunk
driving roadblock investigations are very subjectively intrusive. Cf United States v.
Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979) (holds that random suspicionless stop and
boarding of vessel by Coast Guard after dark violates fourth amendment because gov-
ernmental purpose of enforcing safety and registration regulations can be accomplished
through "less intrusive means" of inspections during daylight hours).
"' See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979) (emphasis added):
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking
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nized that a police stop of a moving vehicle is likely to be "materially
more intrusive" than the average police stop of a pedestrian, because of
the opportunity offered by an automobile stop to inspect areas of the
passenger compartment not otherwise observable.25 '
Drunk driving roadblocks interrupt the travel of vast numbers of in-
nocent motorists255 and subject them to police scrutiny. Many automo-
bile travelers may reasonably resent this interference with their privacy,
security, and freedom. For example, some may reasonably find that be-
ing "sniffed" for alcoholic breath is very unpleasant."' For these rea-
sons, the substantial subjective intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoints
should not be overlooked.2"7
on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves
by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual subject to
unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile,
the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously
circumscribed.
Recent improvements in mobile telephone technology have caused a rapid increase in
car telephones, which should continue to become more common. This development en-
hances the automobile's status as a setting for private personal and business activity,
thereby augmenting car travelers' privacy expectations. See generally Pottle & Frick,
Mobile Telephone: The Personal Connection, PERSONAL COM. MAG., July-Aug. 1984,
at 61, 61-64; Anderson, Cellular Phone Use to Boom, U.S.A. Today, Oct. 4, 1984, at
3B. (The authors are grateful to Professor Eli M. Noam, Director of the Columbia
University Research Program in Telecommunications Policy, for bringing this point to
their attention.)
24 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(dictum); accord People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 487, 438 N.E.2d 864, 867, 453
N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (1982) ("[Tlhe obvious impact of stopping the progress of an auto-
mobile is more intrusive than the minimal intrusion involved in stopping a
pedestrian.").
s See supra note 195 and infra note 271.
256 The subjective intrusiveness of being "sniffed" has been recognized in the context
of canine drug searches. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470,
478-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that dogs' sniffing of students without individualized
suspicion was an unconstitutional search) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3536 (1983):
The commentators agree that "the intensive smelling of people, even if
done by dogs, [is] indecent and demeaning." . . . Most persons in our
society deliberately attempt not to expose the odors emanating from their
bodies to public smell. In contrast, where the Supreme Court has upheld
limited investigations of body characteristics not justified by individualized
suspicion, it has done so on the grounds that the particular characteristic
was routinely exhibited to the public . . . . Intentional close proximity
sniffing of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or human.
5. In fourth amendment rubric, an automobile stop involves a "seizure" of the per-
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The Supreme Court has stressed that another crucial determinant of
the subjective intrusiveness of a search or seizure, in addition to the
privacy expectations involved, is the degree of discretion wielded by
those conducting it. 58 A drunk driving roadblock involves a broad
range of discretionary decisions regarding investigatory techniques. So-
briety checkpoint investigations are not susceptible to such routine, uni-
form administration as Border Patrol checkpoints or license-registration
roadblocks. To make a meaningful assessment of a driver's sobriety, the
police officer at a drunk driving roadblock will have to tailor the na-
ture, scope, and duration of the investigation to the particular driver.
The determinations concerning what types of observations to make,
what - if anything - the driver should be asked to say or do, and
what constitutes sufficient cause to trigger further investigation are in-
herently discretionary.259 While the initial roadblock stop may be uni-
form and automatic, every subsequent investigatory decision requires
discretion. Since the Supreme Court considers an investigation to be
subjectively intrusive if its targets feel singled out for special treatment,
the Court should define drunk driving roadblock investigations as sub-
jectively intrusive for this added reason.26
son. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Until recently, the Supreme Court
regarded such a seizure, no matter where it occurred, as one of the most serious inva-
sions of the freedom, privacy, and personal security protected by the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)):
This inestimable [fourth amendment] right of personal security belongs as
much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner clos-
eted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. For, as this Court has
always recognized, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
See also supra note 40. More recent Supreme Court decisions, which characterize
roadblock stops as involving a minimal intrusion on fourth amendment interests, reflect
the Court's narrowing view of the concerns underlying the fourth amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
2" See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
"' See supra text accompanying note 65.
260 See supra text accompanying note 154. In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975), the Court invalidated automobile searches conducted by Border Patrol agents at
border checkpoints to detect illegal aliens. Although all cars were stopped, only some,
selected at random, were searched. Because motorists were subjected to investigations of
varying length and scope, the Court viewed these investigations as subjectively intru-
sive, akin to the random Border Patrol stops invalidated in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The Court explained:
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Sobriety checkpoints are also more subjectively intrusive than previ-
ously approved suspicionless searches and seizures because they aim to
deter and apprehend criminals. As the Court has recognized, " ' an indi-
vidual who undergoes a search or seizure will reasonably experience
greater concern or fright "2 when its purpose is to enforce the criminal
law than when its purpose is to enforce an administrative scheme. " 3
The greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of
privacy that a search entails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly
reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are
searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. Where only a
few are singled out for a search . . . motorists may find the searches espe-
cially offensive.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895. The foregoing reasoning appears to have been at least some-
what undermined by United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976), in
which the Court authorized Border Patrol agents randomly to refer some motorists who
had been stopped at a border checkpoint to a "secondary inspection area" for more
extensive questioning (although not for the vehicle searches at issue in Ortiz).
"2 The Court has noted that an individual's interest in privacy and personal security
"suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal
laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978). However, it has consistently cited the noncriminal
aim of certain searches and seizures as a factor justifying an exception to the probable
cause requirement. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 60.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
263 Several courts that have ruled upon roadblock investigations have stressed the
crucial importance of the criminal-administrative distinction. A determination that such
roadblocks were not being used as a subterfuge to conduct criminal law enforcement
searches (including searches relating to drunk driving) was essential to a conclusion of
legality. See, e.g., Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106, 118 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (con-
sent decree authorized license-registration roadblocks only if specific steps are taken to
assure that criminal law enforcement needs have no role in conduct of roadblocks; for
example, only officers whose primary duties are traffic enforcement may be present);
State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (inval-
idated roadblocks ostensibly for enforcing license and registration requirements, because
court found that their real purpose was drunk driving enforcement); State v. Smith, 674
P.2d 562, 563-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (invalidated roadblock allegedly maintained
to check drivers' licenses because primary purpose was to identify drunk drivers;
Martinez-Fuerte distinguished because Border Patrol stops are not intended to seek out
criminals; subjective intrusiveness at drunk driving roadblock was great because ap-
proaching motorists "would reasonably perceive the officers as being desirous of arrest-
ing criminals and that anyone passing through could easily be arrested"); see also
supra note 99; cf Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (up-
holding canine drug search of school students, without individualized suspicion, because
purpose of search is to maintain discipline within school; stating that "[i]f the search
had been conducted for the purpose of discovering evidence to be used in a criminal
prosecution, the school may well have had to satisfy a standard of probable cause"),
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When analyzed pursuant to the Supreme Court's reasonableness or
balancing approach, drunk driving roadblocks could be found unconsti-
tutional, as well as unwise. Empirical evidence does not establish their
effectiveness in detecting or deterring drunk driving, much less their
comparatively greater effectiveness than alternative law enforcement
techniques that are consonant with fourth amendment values. Drunk
driving roadblocks also intrude substantially on individual liberty and
privacy, both objectively and subjectively. For these reasons, the analy-
sis that led to the Supreme Court's apparent approval of license-
registration roadblocks2.. points to a contrary conclusion respecting
drunk driving roadblocks.
III. DRUNK DRIVING ROADBLOCKS AND THE VALUES
UNDERLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Regardless of how the Supreme Court and other federal courts might
rule on the fourth amendment issues presented by drunk driving road-
blocks, state court judges and policymakers could still reject them. As
recognized by a rapidly growing body of case law and scholarly litera-
ture, when interpreting state constitutional provisions, state courts may
legitimately depart from authoritative interpretations of analogous fed-
eral constitutional provisions.265 Therefore, a state court could hold that
drunk driving roadblocks violate the fourth amendment's state constitu-
tional counterpart, regardless of whether the Supreme Court holds
affd in pertinent part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1022 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 339-42 (suggesting that purpose of
sobriety checkpoints be limited to enforcement of administrative regulations).
264 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
265 In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Court stated that "a State is free as
a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary under federal constitutional standards." Id. at 719 (empha-
sis in original) (dictum). See generally Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than
"Adequate" Non-federal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Hill & Marks,
Foreword: Toward a Federalist System of Rights, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1; Project
Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
271, 284-96 (1973).
For an example of a state court decision interpreting the state constitution as impos-
ing stricter limits upon law enforcement authorities than the federal constitution specif-
ically in the context of anti-drunk driving measures, compare South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1983) (admission at trial of defendant's refusal to submit to
blood alcohol test, when arresting officer had not fully warned defendant of conse-
quences of refusal, does not violate federal due process clause) with State v. Neville,
346 N.W.2d 425, 430-31 (S.D. 1984) (same case on remand) (admission of defendant's
refusal violates due process clause of South Dakota Constitution).
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them to violate the fourth amendment itself. Several state court judges
have already rejected sobriety checkpoints on state constitutional
grounds.266
Police administrators and legislators could also reject drunk driving
roadblocks because of the serious constitutional problems they raise.267
It is entirely appropriate for policymakers to decide against a proposed
law enforcement innovation based upon their independent views, aside
from any judicial rulings, that the measure would intrude upon a con-
stitutional danger zone.268 Some police administrators269 and legisla-
166 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 10, 663 P.2d 992,
1001 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring); People v. Bartley, 125 Il. App. 3d 375, 466
N.E.2d 346 (1984).
267 Policymakers could also reject sobriety checkpoints because they are insufficiently
productive. See supra text accompanying notes 167-79 & 194-227.
268 See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional In-
terpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587, 590, 595 (1975) ("legislators are obligated to
determine . . . the constitutionality of proposed legislation" and should not necessarily
be bound by Supreme Court's constitutional holdings; "the conscientious legislator will
treat a law's adverse effects on constitutionally protected interests as a cost in the intui-
tive cost-benefit analysis that underlies the legislative process"; deferential standards of
judicial review may imply that legislative standards should be more rigorous); cf.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 243-44, 252 (1976) ("We do
not assume that a law has been constitutionally made merely because a court will not
set it aside . . . . A governor or a President ought to veto, on constitutional grounds, a
bill that he knows to have been adopted in violation of a constitutionally required pro-
cedure, even though the courts would not question its enactment."; public and other
branches of government should not treat any law as legitimate merely because it sur-
vives judicial evaluation through weighing of competing social and personal interests).
(The authors are grateful to New York University School of Law Professor Lawrence
G. Sager for commending these authorities to their attention.)
269 Carroll D. Buracker, the Police Chief of Fairfax County, Virginia, has rejected
drunk driving roadblocks for four reasons, involving policy and constitutional
considerations:
Roadblocks seem to us to affect the innocent citizen more than the
drunken driver.
[Under the Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), requirement that
seizures be reasonable, it has not been] demonstrated, to our satisfaction,
that they are especially efficacious as a drunken driver enforcement
measure.
So-called "high impact" enforcement strategies, such as roadblocks, task
forces, and other special measures, have been demonstrated to have only a
fleeting effect on enforcement problems that tend to be persistent and re-
curring in nature, as is the case with drunk driving offenses . ...
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tors. have opposed drunk driving roadblocks for these reasons.
The salient feature of all drunk driving roadblocks, which raises seri-
ous constitutional and policy concerns, is that motorists are detained
and investigated without any basis to believe they have violated any
laws. This central feature of the drunk driving roadblock sets it apart
from our normal law enforcement techniques and the fourth amend-
ment values they reflect. Sobriety checkpoints do not target for investi-
gation individuals reasonably suspected of having committed a crime.
Rather, on the chance of turning up criminal law violators, police of-
ficers investigate all motorists who pass through the checkpoint.
American police have long deployed roadblocks on limited occasions
for specific purposes. But the systematic use of roadblocks to conduct
routine mass vehicle stops aimed at combating drunk driving constitutes
a marked departure from previous practice. The conventional roadblock
is set up to intercept kidnappers, bank robbers, or other felony suspects
fleeing the scene of a crime. In contrast with drunk driving roadblocks,
which have an extremely widespread impact,"' conventional roadblocks
occur infrequently within any jurisdiction and affect only a tiny per-
centage of the driving public.2" More importantly, these conventional
Moreover, [roadblocks] represent a substantial diversion of resources
away from other important areas.
Buracker, The "Roadblock" Strategy as a Drunken Driver Enforcement Measure, 51
POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 1984, at 59, 59-62.
270 A bill introduced during the 1983 session of Maryland's House of Delegates
would have prohibited the operation of drunk driving roadblocks throughout that state.
See Md. H.D. 265 (1983 Regular Session) (a bill entitled, "An Act concerning 'Sobri-
ety Checkpoint' Prohibition"); see also Maryland Seeks to End Checks for Sobriety,
Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1983, at BI, col. 5 (state legislator describes drunk driving road-
blocks as police tactic he might expect to see "in Russia, or Hitler-occupied
Germany"). The bill was not favorably reported out of committee. Daily Rec. (Balti-
more), Mar. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 7.
27' For example, roadblocks implemented in Westchester County, New York from
January through November 1983 stopped anywhere from 1000 to 4000 vehicles per
night. WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, SOBRIETY CHECK-
POINTS (1981) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review). In New York City, nightly
roadblocks involving approximately 100 officers, set up at bridges and tunnels connect-
ing Manhattan to the other boroughs, stopped 624,000 motorists between May 27,
1983, and October 16, 1983. Telephone interview with Catherine Keegan, Assistant to
Joel Stahl, Commissioner of the New York Department of Transportation (Nov. 12,
1983); see also supra note 195 and text accompanying note 214.
22 Because police operating traditional roadblocks often have some description of the
cars or the passengers they are seeking, they generally neither stop all cars nor question
all motorists passing through the roadblock. See, e.g., State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash.
App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980) (based upon information provided by burglary victim,
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roadblocks are completely consistent with traditional police efforts to
apprehend specific criminal suspects (and, in the case of kidnapping, to
rescue specific crime victims),273 within a certain geographic area, soon
after a particular crime has been committed and reported. It would be
very different if the police decided to cordon off all roads surrounding
all banks to check motorists for evidence of bank robberies not specifi-
cally known to have been committed, but statistically likely to occur.""T
police stopped all cars departing from certain ferry to look for persons matching
description of burglars).
273 In contrast with drunk driving roadblocks, traditional roadblocks aim at inter-
cepting the perpetrators of ongoing or recently completed crimes that jeopardize human
life. Therefore, the societal interests at stake are particularly urgent. This distinction is
articulated in Justice Jackson's oft-quoted dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 183 (1949):
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw
a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car.
However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed
fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers
to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect
a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and
universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a
bootlegger.
274 The rationale underlying conventional roadblocks could justify a drunk driving
roadblock only if it were set up to apprehend a particular drunk driver who had al-
ready committed a felony (killing or injuring another driver), and who the police rea-
sonably believed to be fleeing the scene of the crime along the road where the roadblock
was located. See United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 40-41 (4th Cir.) (upholding
stops of all vehicles on route reasonably expected to be used for escape of persons sus-
pected of having imported 25 tons of marijuana) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 887 (1980):
The purpose of these stops was to arrest suspects for a known crime, not
to discover evidence of undetected crimes by the happenstance of visual
searches. A serious crime had been committed involving numerous partici-
pants, some of whom were known to be fleeing the scene along a route
reasonably expected to be used for their escape ....
The Fourth Amendment does not create barriers to reasonable law en-
forcement activities in the area of a detected crime . . . .By virtue of the
exigency of fleeing, perhaps dangerous, suspects, we think the stops of all
persons found on a likely access route to the scene of the crime was rea-
sonable .. .
The limitations upon a conventional roadblock, which set it apart from a drunk driv-
ing roadblock, are delineated in the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 110.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1975). The Code provides that an officer may stop
and search cars if "he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed
and stopping all or most . . .motor vehicles moving in a particular direction . .. is
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Is it likely that such a tactic would be upheld on the rationale that it
might deter motorists and the general citizenry from committing bank
robberies? Not in the view of Professor Wayne LaFave, who has
stated:
It is not permissible for the police to celebrate Burglary Prevention Week
by setting up random roadblocks to search cars for burglary tools, to
blockade a high-crime area of the city and search all cars leaving the area,
or to establish roadblocks to curb the juvenile problem. Such tactics as
these pose the most serious threat to the interest of privacy."'
Despite Professor LaFave's thoughtful conclusion that roadblocks can-
not be justified by their avowed general deterrent effect, state courts
have upheld drunk driving roadblocks on just this rationale. 76
Drunk driving roadblocks share the fundamental characteristic com-
mon to the hypothetical bank robbery roadblock posited above and the
other roadblocks described by Professor LaFave: they are aimed not at
detecting identified or suspected offenders, but instead at turning up
previously unidentified and unsuspected offenders, and at deterring fu-
ture unlawful conduct. Acceptance of drunk driving roadblocks would
signal approval of policing that relies upon the statistical chance of un-
covering a certain percentage of violators in large groups of persons.
Once accepted in the drunk driving context, this dragnet technique
could be extended to other pressing law enforcement problems, such as
possession of narcotics or firearms, mugging, shoplifting, or bank rob-
beries. There is a strong parallel between a drunk driving roadblock
investigation based upon the statistical likelihood that a certain number
of passing drivers will be under the influence of alcohol and, for exam-
ple, a requirement that all pedestrians on a certain street submit to a
frisk or magnetometer search based upon the statistical likelihood that
some of them will be carrying a gun or knife illegally.77
reasonably necessary to permit a search for the perpetrator or victim . . . in view of the
seriousness and special circumstances of such felony." Id.
25 W. LAFAVE, supra note 98, § 9.5(b), at 145 (1972).
276 See, e.g., Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) ("prospect
of being stopped at a roadblock . . . convinced some intoxicated individuals to find
alternate means of transportation"); 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 471, 481 (1984) (advance
warning increases deterrent effect); see also State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136
Ariz. 1, 10, 663 P.2d 992, 1001 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring).
277 Drunk driving roadblocks lack any clear distinguishing feature that would pre-
vent their use as a precedent for implementing other dragnet law enforcement tactics.
See, e.g., the following statement by the Executive Director of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union of Maryland:
What principle inherent in [drunk driving] roadblock stops limits their
use? That people are in cars? The courts and common sense have long
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, the long-range precedential
impact of any challenged governmental action should be a factor in
evaluating its lawfulness.278 Therefore, in evaluating drunk driving
roadblock investigations, policymakers and courts should consider the
adverse impact upon fourth amendment values of the entire genre of
suspicionless, dragnet searches and seizures.
Fourth amendment history and Supreme Court precedents make
clear the Founders' intention to bar police interference with our citi-
zens' privacy and freedom on the mere chance of uncovering wrongdo-
ing. The primary characteristic of the general warrants and writs of
assistance that were so odious to the Constitutional Framers, and which
the fourth amendment was expressly designed to curb, was precisely
"their indiscriminate quality, their license to search Everyman without
particularized cause."2" ' In his seminal article on the fourth amend-
ment, Professor Anthony Amsterdam articulated the twin evils of indis-
held that the right to privacy is not obliterated by a steering wheel. That
the police intrusion is minimal? If you refuse to stop or roll down your
window or be properly sheep-like, you'll discover how "minimal" the po-
lice consider the matter - arrest or worse will ensue. That drunken driv-
ing is especially abominable and we need immediate, effective steps against
it? Of course, drunken driving is awful, and, of course, roadblocks may
"work." But there are dozens of offenses as vile as drunk driving. It would
"work" to allow the police to search everyone entering a schoolhouse for
drugs, alcohol or weapons; to demand, in a crackdown against shoplifting,
that everyone carrying bags of merchandise during the Christmas season
show the police proof of purchase; or periodically to search homes in se-
lected neighborhoods for heroin, pistols, stolen goods or escaped prisoners.
We disposed of these alternatives a couple of hundred years ago, when we
decided not to be an authoritarian society.
Roemer, Debate & Discussion, Sobriety Checkpoints, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 8, 1983
(copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review).
270 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("Illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by . . .slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitu-
tional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued."); see also West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)
("[Tihe First Amendment . . .was designed to avoid these [totalitarian] ends by avoid-
ing these beginnings.").
279 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1167 (1763); see also 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 139-44 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965). Dragnet searches and
seizures under general warrants were repudiated in England more than two centuries
ago and met with still less favor in the colonies. James Otis denounced them as "'the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the
fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book.' " Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (quoting James Otis).
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criminate searches and seizures:
Indiscriminate searches or seizures might be thought to be bad for either
or both of two reasons. The first is that they expose people and their
possessions to interferences by government when there is no good reason to
do so. The concern here is against unjustified searches and seizures: it
rests upon the principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his
person and property unless and until an adequate justification for dis-
turbing that security is shown. The second is that indiscriminate searches
and seizures are conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may
act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and
seize. This latter concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it
condemns the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers2 8
The Supreme Court recently has been so intent upon eradicating the
second evil inherent in indiscriminate searches that it has shown insuf-
ficient concern about the first.28 ' In its zeal to forestall arbitrary
searches and seizures, the Court has too readily allowed certain unjusti-
fied searches and seizures. 82 For example, in Delaware v. Prouse,8 3
the Supreme Court disapproved "sporadic and random stops of individ-
ual vehicles making their way through city traffic.""28 However, it ap-
proved "those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are
brought to a halt or to a near halt, and all are subjected to a show of
the police power of the community.""28 Thus, investigations without
specific justification are apparently acceptable as long as they do not
appear arbitrary or discriminatory.8 Prouse and other recent Supreme
280 Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 411.
281 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
282 Indeed, in certain contexts, the Court has expressly encouraged unjustified
searches and seizures in an effort to limit arbitrary searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
558-59 (1976) (both endorsing roadblocks at which all vehicles stopped, while disap-
proving random stops of some vehicles).
283 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (involving car stops to check for drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations). This case is discussed extensively supra text accompanying notes 92-97
& 163-74.
28 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
28. Id. (emphasis added). Dissenting in Prouse, Justice Rehnquist aptly highlighted
the flawed reasoning that led his brethren to endorse roadblock stops:
Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be
"frightened" or "annoyed" when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman
needs neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists
on a particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable suspicion
stop less than all motorists. The Court thus elevates the adage "misery
loves company" to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 644 (emphasis in original).
28. Another example of this truncated view of the fourth amendment is the Court's
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Court decisions ignore the fourth amendment's first and foremost con-
cern for protecting autonomy, privacy, and freedom from unjustified
governmental interference, no matter how uniformly and routinely car-
ried out.287 In Professor Amsterdam's words:
[Tlhe authors of the Bill of Rights had known oppressive government
... I believe they meant to guarantee to their survivors the right to live
as free from every interference of government agents as our condition
would permit.
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and free-
dom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
with the aims of a free and open society."'
Viewed in these terms, the argument against the wholesale detention
indication in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), that a search or seizure does not
necessarily require individualized suspicion, so long as it is "carried out pursuant to a
plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." This
suggestion was premised on the Court's expressed view that the purpose of the individ-
ualized suspicion requirement is to prevent "arbitrary invasions [of privacy] solely [in]
the unfettered discretion of officers in the field," id. (emphasis added), and that this
purpose can also be served by the "neutral plan" requirement, id. The fallacy in this
view is that it overlooks the additional, at least equally important, purpose of the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement - to prevent unjustified invasions of individual free-
dom, security, or privacy. This purpose is not served by the "neutral plan"
requirement.
The Court's emphasis on preventing arbitrary, as opposed to unjustifed, searches and
seizures, has also had the effect of diluting the fourth amendment's protections in an-
other sense. The Court has focused on the amendment's requirement that searches and
seizures be reasonable in their execution, while discounting the amendment's concomi-
tant requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable in their inception. See infra
notes 293 & 309 and text accompanying notes 291-93.
28, In its venerable decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1886)
(holding that statute authorizing government to compel production of documents for use
in forfeiture proceedings violated fourth and fifth amendments), the Supreme Court
referred to the principles enunciated in Lord Camden's seminal decision in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765), and declared that these principles:
[A]ffect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security . ...
[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its em-
ploy~s of the . . . privacies of life . . . . [T]he essence of the offence . ..
is the invasion of [one's] indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by
his conviction of some public offence. . ..
See also the passage from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted supra note 26.
2" Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 400, 403.
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and investigation of citizens at drunk driving roadblocks is compelling
indeed. Far from being consistent with the aims of a free and open
society, these roadblocks evoke strong images of authoritarianism. A
free and open society does not authorize its police to interdict, inspect,
and interrogate its citizens en masse merely because it is statistically
predictable that a certain small percentage is breaking the law at any
given time. 89 As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals declared, in
rejecting drunk driving roadblocks:
The Court finds drunk [driving roadblocks] . . . draw dangerously close
to what may be referred to as a police state. Here, the state agencies have
ignored the presumption of innocence, assuming that criminal conduct
must be occurring on the roads and highways, and have taken an "end
justifies the means" approach . . . . [A] basic tenet of American jurispru-
dence is that the government cannot assume criminal conduct in effectuat-
ing a stop . . . . Were the authorities allowed to maintain such activities
• . . the next logical step would be to allow similar stops for searching out
other types of criminal law offenders."'
Regardless of whether the fourth amendment values reflected in the
289 See Justice Hans Linde's dissent in State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 856, 618
P.2d 423, 444 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981) (approving suspicionless road-
block stops to enforce hunting regulations):
The guarantees of the fourth amendment and Oregon's [corresponding
constitutional provision] have a broad role as institutional and procedural
safeguards in shaping the conduct of government officers before the fact
* . . . The security and freedom from unwarranted official impositions
that the search and seizure clauses guarantee is that of "the people," of
men and women going about their everyday business, not only or primar-
ily the interests of criminal suspects.
See also State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 546-47, 673 P.2d 1174, 1188 (1983) (Prager,
J., dissenting) (If each political subdivision in the state were free to institute a drunk
driving roadblock, Kansans potentially would have to go through " 'Checkpoint Char-
ley' at the boundary of every city and every county.").
290 State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); accord State ex rel.
Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feldman, J.,
concurring):
The issue [presented by drunk driving roadblocks] . . . is whether the
fourth amendment permits officers to stop and question persons whose
conduct is innocent, unremarkable and free from suspicion.
The question has frightening implications. The thought that an
American can be compelled to "show his papers" before exercising his
right to walk the streets, drive the highways or board the trains is repug-
nant to American institutions and ideals . . . . It might be argued that if
the law did permit such stops, we would have less crime. Nevertheless, our
system is based on the idea that the risk of criminal activity is less of a
danger than the risk of unfettered interference with personal liberty.
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preceding statement lead courts to hold sobriety checkpoints unconstitu-
tional, they could lead policymakers to opt for alternative anti-drunk
driving strategies.
IV. DRUNK DRIVING ROADBLOCKS AND PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS
Searches and seizures must be reasonable not only in their inception,
but also in their execution.' The imposition of procedural safeguards
to promote the goal that searches and seizures be reasonably executed is
certainly important.292 However, it bears emphasis that even the maxi-
mal degree of reasonableness in the execution of a search or seizure
cannot cure a lack of reasonableness in its inception. The irreducible
central feature of roadblock investigations, which undermines their rea-
sonableness at the inception stage, is their lack of individualized justifi-
cation. Nevertheless, in the event that any sobriety checkpoint investi-
gations are authorized, notwithstanding the constitutional and policy
problems they raise, this part of the Article recommends procedural
safeguards for their execution.
The Supreme Court has enforced the reasonableness-in-execution re-
quirement particularly stringently with respect to searches and seizures
not based on probable cause.293 For example, the Court recently held
that a Terry-type..4 stop violated the fourth amendment because its
scope and duration exceeded permissible limits. The Court stated that a
Terry-type stop must "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate its
purpose. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the
least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the of-
ficer's suspicion in a short period of time."2" The Court further de-
29 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
292 As Justice Frankfurter observed: "The history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 347 (1943).
293 In some sense, the Court seems to recognize an inverse relationship between the
degree of reasonableness required in the inception of a search or seizure, and the degree
of reasonableness required in its execution. The less reasonable a search or seizure is in
its inception - i.e., the more it departs from the probable cause standard - the more
carefully the Court will scrutinize its scope, duration, and other operational details to
ensure that it was carried out reasonably. This inverse relationship may help explain
why the Court appears to require a least intrusive alternative approach in examining
certain searches and seizures not based upon probable cause, even though it has not
imposed such a requirement upon searches and seizures in general. See supra note 143.
294 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44 (defining Terry-type stop).
.. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). In United States v. Sharpe, 105 S.
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clared that "[i]t is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it
seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently
limited in scope and duration." '96 Because the searches and seizures
that occur at drunk driving roadblocks are not justified even by the
relaxed reasonable suspicion standard, the foregoing requirements
should be enforced even more rigorously than in the Terry-stop context.
Supreme Court decisions have also stressed that the execution of
searches or seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion
must not be left to the discretion of individual officers in the field. Ac-
cordingly, these decisions have turned on the sufficiency of restrictions
curbing field officer discretion.297
In accordance with the foregoing principles, under no circumstances
should a drunk driving roadblock be permitted unless it involves suffi-
cient procedural safeguards limiting field officers' discretion in execut-
ing roadblock investigations. The governmental unit administering any
drunk driving roadblock should have the burden of proving: (1) that the
initial investigations last no longer than necessary to make a prelimi-
nary determination whether a driver is intoxicated, and employ the
least intrusive procedures reasonably available for quick determination;
(2) that if intoxication is reasonably suspected after an initial investiga-
tion, any further investigation is also as brief and unintrusive as rea-
sonably possible; and (3) that all phases of the investigations are carried
out in accordance with neutral procedures strictly limiting field officer
discretion.
The government should be required to show that the sobriety check-
points are operated pursuant to measures curbing field officer discre-
tion, as well as the duration and scope of checkpoint investigations.
Such measures might include: general statutory authorization expres-
sing a legislative determination that drunk driving roadblocks are ap-
propriate under specified circumstances;298 detailed administrative regu-
lations prescribing all aspects of the design and operation of each
Ct. 1568 (1985), discussed supra note 44, the Court recently reaffirmed this least in-
trusive alternative approach for assessing whether searches and seizures not based on
probable cause are reasonable. For a general discussion of the role of the least intrusive
alternative analysis in fourth amendment jurisprudence, see supra note 143. Although
the Court has not employed this approach in evaluating all searches and seizures, the
approach should logically be an element in all fourth amendment balancing tests, see
id.
296 Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
29, See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
218 See infra text accompanying notes 303-07.
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roadblock;299 area search warrants governing the location and duration
of any particular roadblock; 00 operation at a fixed permanent location,
or sufficient advance notice;30' and exclusionary rules barring the use of
evidence obtained at drunk driving roadblocks in criminal
prosecutions.302
A. Statutory Authorization
As the Supreme Court has indicated, statutory authorization is an
essential, although not sufficient, condition for the validity of any
search or seizure not based upon probable cause. 3 The Court has not
assumed the legality of such searches or seizures even if it concludes
they are permitted by the fourth amendment. For example, in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,"" the Court held a suspi-
cionless administrative inspection invalid specifically because it had not
been authorized by statute, but indicated that, if it had been so author-
ized, the fourth amendment would have permitted the inspection.0
In the context of sobriety checkpoints, statutes should both authorize
such checkpoints under specified circumstances and prescribe the mini-
mal procedural safeguards circumscribing any checkpoint operation.0 6
Several recent state court decisions invalidating drunk driving road-
blocks have expressly relied on the absence of statutory authorization. 7
299 See infra text accompanying notes 308-21.
300 See infra text accompanying notes 322-24.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 325-34.
302 See infra text accompanying notes 335-42. Many of the courts that have ruled
upon the legality of drunk driving roadblocks have held these types of measures to be
essential for a roadblock to withstand constitutional challenge. See cases cited supra
note 8.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2577-78 (1983)
(Customs document inspection on oceangoing vessel was executed pursuant to statute
whose lineal ancestors date back to First Congress); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 566 n.19 (1976) (Court stressed "longstanding congressional authoriza-
tion" for Border Patrol stops at permanent checkpoints); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (Legality of "a regulatory inspection system of business premises
that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope . . . depends . . . on the authority of
a valid statute."); see also supra text accompanying note 69.
304 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
I01 d. at 76-77; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 314 (1972) ("[Ijt is
clear under Colonnade that the Fourth Amendment would not bar a seizure of illicit
liquor.").
300 See, e.g., 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 471 (1984).
307 The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas recently invalidated a drunk driving
roadblock on the ground that under Pennsylvania's vehicle and traffic laws, the police
had statutory authority to stop drivers only based upon probable cause. The court com-
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Of course, it is an axiom of our legal-political system that no legislative
authorization can cure constitutional deficiencies.
B. Detailed Administrative Rules
To ensure that any drunk driving roadblocks that legislatures might
authorize are set up and operated in a manner as consonant as possible
with fourth amendment values, all aspects of such roadblocks should be
prescribed at the highest agency level, and detailed written rules should
be distributed to all field officers."' The Supreme Court has recognized
that if an officer's discretion is not limited by the reasonable suspicion
or probable cause requirement, it must instead be checked by "a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations. '"309 Administrative rules gov-
mented that the state legislature "has not yet chosen to permit an arbitrary blocking of
the Commonwealth's highways to seek out an intoxicated motorist." Commonwealth v.
Jackson, No. 1672-83, slip. op. (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Feb. 9, 1984). In State v.
Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), the court held all investigations at
drunk driving roadblocks unconstitutional because they were not based upon any indi-
vidualized suspicion. The court observed that there was "no statutory authority which
would support ...the State's contention that it has the power to establish" drunk
driving roadblocks. Id. at 565; see also State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 543, 673 P.2d
1174, 1185 (1983) (although majority upheld a particular drunk driving roadblock, it
suggested that "minimum uniform standards for the operation" of a roadblock should
be adopted by the legislature or attorney general); id. at 545-47, 673 P.2d at 1188
(Prager, J., dissenting) (absence of legislative standards and limitations would free all
730 jurisdictional units in state to establish roadblocks); Commonwealth v.
McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983) (observed that statutorily
prescribed drunk driving roadblocks would be preferable, but expressly refrained from
deciding whether statutory authorization was constitutionally required).
308 As one state court judge noted, in delineating the procedural requirements that he
believed to be constitutionally necessary for suspicionless roadblock stops: "The mere
fact of statutory authorization is not enough. The question is whether the law or delib-
erate agency policies promulgated under it give reasonable discretion and limits to the
investigatory power or leave that power at large in the hands of individual officers."
State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 883-84, 618 P.2d 423, 443 (1980) (Linde, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
30' Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citations omitted) (holding unconstitu-
tional state statute that allowed police to detain someone and require identification,
even without any reasonable suspicion to believe individual had engaged in criminal
conduct):
A central concern [in fourth amendment jurisprudence] has been to as-
sure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to
arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field
... .To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must
be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate in-
terests require the seizure . . .or that the seizure must be carried out
670 [Vol. 18:595
1985] Drunk Driving Roadblocks 671
erning sobriety checkpoints should reduce the appearance, as well as
the actuality, of arbitrary or unnecessarily intrusive roadblock investi-
gations; in the Supreme Court's terminology, they should minimize
both subjective and objective intrusiveness.3
Administrative rules should prescribe both the location of drunk
driving roadblocks and their manner of operation. The selection of lo-
cations should be based on such factors as the number and frequency of
serious accidents and the proximity of bars. The choice of a particular
site should result in the detection and deterrence of substantial numbers
of drunk drivers. The site selection should not reflect or result in invidi-
ous discrimination against any drivers." ' Safety should not be jeopard-
ized nor traffic flow unduly hindered." 2 Administrative rules should
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct
of individual officers.
As pointed out, supra note 286, the Brown decision focuses largely on the fourth
amendment's concern for eliminating arbitrariness in the carrying out of searches and
seizures, while deemphasizing the fourth amendment's concern for requiring individu-
alized justification in the undertaking of searches and seizures. Its pertinence in the
present context therefore underscores the point that none of the recommended adminis-
trative rules governing the execution of roadblock investigations can solve the problems
posed by the lack of individualized cause for commencing such investigations.
"' Professor Amsterdam has proposed a general requirement that, in order to be
upheld under the fourth amendment, all searches and seizures must be "conducted pur-
suant to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and
regulations," which "must be reasonably particular in setting forth the nature of the
searches and seizures and the circumstances under which they should be made."
Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 416. The major function of such a general rulemaking
requirement would be to provide "a pervasive safeguard against arbitrary searches and
seizures." Id. In particular, Professor Amsterdam emphasized that such a requirement
would check the danger of arbitrariness inherent in searches and seizures which, like
drunk driving roadblock investigations, are not based upon probable cause:
[Rlulemaking supplies a needed check against arbitrariness in the conduct
of various searches and seizures that presently occupy a troubling fourth
amendment limbo. These include border searches, stoppings of automo-
biles for driver's license checks . . . inspections of the premises of gun
dealers and liquor dealers, and other routine law enforcement practices
which, for a variety of reasons, have been exempted from the requirements
of a warrant or probable cause.
Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
3" See Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Minn. 1984) (court ordered
that locations of all sites for roadblocks at which drivers were stopped to participate in
survey regarding drinking-driving behavior be chosen without regard to any racial, eth-
nic, or economic characteristics of surrounding population or neighborhood, or of popu-
lation using roadway).
312 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353
(1983) (in invalidating drunk driving roadblock, court stressed that roadblock area was
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specify lighting, signs, and other physical arrangements that would
maximize safety and convenience and minimize surprise and anxiety. 13
The guidelines should also provide for advance warning through media
publicity of sobriety checkpoints' locations and times. 1 '
In addition, the administrative rules should delineate investigative
procedures. Neutral procedures for selecting cars to be stopped should
be specified in detail, providing for the stopping of every car or every
nth car, and expressly prohibiting the consideration of arbitrary or in-
vidious factors (for example, the race or appearance of the driver or the
type of automobile)." 5 Officers should have clear instructions concern-
ing what they should say and do once a car has been stopped and the
types of observations that they should make." 6 The length of the stop
should be limited to approximately a minute or less,31 and the rules
should expressly prohibit the officers from prolonging it unless they
have at least a reasonable suspicion, based upon articulable objective
unsafe for motorists, and that motorists were backed up on highway for at least two-
thirds of a mile).
33 See, e.g., 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 471, 481-83 (1984). Appropriate physical re-
quirements would include, for example: adequate lighting, such as overhead lights or
roadside flares; barriers set up in advance of the roadblock causing drivers to slow
down sufficiently to reduce traffic hazards; large roadside signs in advance of the road-
block, announcing its location and purpose; and an area into which drivers can pull
aside should the officers have a sufficient factual basis to conduct any investigation
beyond the limited inquiry permitted during the initial stop.
"' Some courts that have passed upon drunk driving roadblocks have viewed the
degree of advance warning provided to the driving public through the media as a very
significant factor. Compare State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663
P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (in invalidating roadblocks, court stressed absence of advance
warning) and Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353
(1983) (in invalidating roadblock, court suggested that advance publication of date of
roadblock, while not constitutionally necessary, would mitigate surprise) with Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984) (in upholding roadblocks, court
noted extensive statewide publicity, including live television coverage, disclosing exact
location in advance). Advance warning of a roadblock may undermine its deterrent
effect. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
.. See supra note 311.
316 See Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (D. Minn. 1984) (court ordered
that as soon as any motorist is stopped pursuant to drinking-driving survey, prescribed
statement, expressly designed to reduce "subjective coercion," must be read to him).
... That this is a reasonable maximum duration for the initial stop at a drunk driv-
ing roadblock is corroborated by the few cases referring to the actual duration of such
stops. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 2, 663 P.2d at 992, 993
(1983) (30-40 seconds to five minutes); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 491-92, 479 A.2d
903, 906 (1984) (15-30 seconds).
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facts, indicating intoxication. 18 The rules should also expressly prohibit
officers from conducting any search of a car, or subjecting any driver to
field sobriety or breath tests, absent evidence satisfying the probable
cause standard. 19 To facilitate agency and judicial enforcement of the
reasonable suspicion and probable cause standards, police officers
should maintain records of the specific articulable facts that assertedly
satisfy such standards in any particular case. 2° The rules should fur-
ther require Miranda warnings to be given no later than when an of-
ficer has probable cause sufficient to administer field sobriety or breath
tests. 21
38 The line between a "reasonable suspicion," based on "specific and articulable
facts," and a mere "inarticulate hunch," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), may
often be very difficult to draw. For that reason, certain jurists and scholars vigorously
opposed the authorization of any searches or seizures based on evidence short of the
probable cause standard. See, e.g., id. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Therefore, it
is particularly important that drunk driving roadblocks not be implemented without
specific guidelines concerning the types of inquiries and observations that may be made
during the initial brief stop, and the resulting conclusions that would give rise to a
"reasonable suspicion" sufficient to prolong the investigation. For an example of facts
that were held to give rise to a reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause) of driver
intoxication, see People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1984) (driver had redness
about his eyes, drove erratically back and forth between center and side of roadbed, and
car had odor of alcohol).
"' The Colorado Supreme Court recently held that roadside sobriety testing could
not be based on a mere "reasonable suspicion" that a person was driving under the
influence of alcohol, but rather, required either probable cause or voluntary consent.
The court noted that the sole purpose of roadside sobriety testing is to acquire evidence
of criminal conduct, and that governmental intrusions into individual privacy for such
purposes require probable cause. The court also noted that because roadside testing
involves "physical maneuvers not normally performed in public or knowingly exposed
to public viewing," it constitutes a "substantial" invasion of privacy. Carlson, 677 P.2d
at 316-17; see also supra note 156.
320 See Ramirez v. Webb, 36 CRIM. L. REP. 2291 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 1984)
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting agents of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) from making suspicionless car stops to seek illegal aliens, and di-
recting INS agents to maintain records of bases for reasonable suspicion allegedly justi-
fying such stops).
32 In Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the Court rejected any per se
rule either that Miranda applies to all traffic stops, or that a suspect stopped for a
traffic offense need not be advised of his rights until formally placed under arrest.
Instead, the Court stated that if and when Miranda warnings should be given to such a
suspect would depend upon factors including the length of the detention, whether the
suspect is subjected to investigation in public view, and whether the detention reasona-
bly could be viewed as the functional equivalent of an arrest. Under these standards,
Miranda warnings are clearly required when a driver has been detained long enough,
and investigated thoroughly enough, to allow the officer to determine that there is prob-
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C. Area Search Warrant
To help assure that the selection of drunk driving roadblock sites is
based upon the factors enumerated in the governing rules, the police
department should be required to obtain from a neutral, independent
magistrate an area search warrant authorizing a sobriety checkpoint at
a particular location for a specified, reasonably limited time period. As
discussed above, even when the Supreme Court has permitted limited
types of searches or seizures to be conducted without probable cause, it
has generally insisted on adherence to the warrant requirement, unless
that requirement is independently excused by an applicable excep-
tion. 22 The potentially useful role that warrants can play in limiting
field officer discretion was summarized by the Supreme Court in a re-
cent Occupational Safety and Health Act inspection case:
A warrant . . . would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the
inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral crite-
ria. Also, a warrant would then and there advise the [individual whose
property was being searched] of the scope and objects of the search, be-
yond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed. 2'
To obtain a warrant authorizing a sobriety checkpoint, the agency
should be required to demonstrate that a serious drunk driving problem
exists in the vicinity of the requested checkpoint; that the proposed tim-
ing of the checkpoint's operation is consistent with the goals of detection
and deterrence; and that the proposed site is consistent with considera-
tions of nondiscrimination, safety, and convenience. 24 The magistrate
should not renew the warrant after expiration of a reasonable time pe-
able cause, and when the officer subjects the driver to field sobriety or chemical tests in
public view.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36 & note 58. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 n.15, 564-66 (1976), the Court rejected the con-
tention that a warrant should be required prior to the establishment of any Border
Patrol immigration enforcement checkpoint. The Court distinguished Border Patrol
checkpoint stops from administrative inspections for which it had required warrants,
because the permanent location of the Border Patrol checkpoints played the same dis-
cretion limiting role that the warrant was designed to serve in the administrative in-
spection cases. Id. at 564-66. For the reasons discussed supra text accompanying notes
65 & 258-60, drunk driving roadblock stops are inherently subject to field officer dis-
cretion. Therefore, to help curb this discretion, area warrants should be required. As
discussed infra text accompanying notes 325-34, sobriety checkpoints should also be
operated at permanent locations or pursuant to sufficient advance notice to enable mo-
torists to avoid them.
323 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
324 See Note, Roadblock Seizures, supra note 16, at 1478-79.
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riod unless the law enforcement agency can demonstrate the check-
point's productivity in terms of either increased drunk driving arrests or
decreased alcohol-related crashes.
While the warrant procedure would require the police to articulate
justifications for every roadblock, it probably would have only a limited
practical impat. The requirement that police justify the choice of a
particular location for a roadblock through evidence of a drunk driving
problem would probably be easily satisfied. When drunk driving road-
blocks are set up for general deterrence purposes, the police logically
cannot be required to justify one location rather than another. They
might choose the safest road in town for a checkpoint as long as it
would yield high visibility. It would be very difficult to dispute effec-
tively a police chief's claim that a roadblock has a general deterrence
effect. Furthermore, constraints on where roadblocks can be safely set
up, insufficient data on the location of disproportionate numbers of
alcohol-related accidents, and the general feeling that the problem is
pervasive, would probably eviscerate any requirement that police justify
particular roadblock operations. Therefore, even if courts were willing
to require the police to demonstrate specifically the need for a particu-
lar roadblock, such demonstrations might become mere formalities.
D. Permanent Location or Advance Notice
The permanent location of the Border Patrol 'checkpoints in
Martinez-Fuerte325 was crucial to the Supreme Court's approval?26
The Court stressed that subjective intrusiveness was significantly re-
duced because motorists "know, or may obtain knowledge of, the loca-
tion of the checkpoints." '327 At least one court has held that any drunk
driving roadblock must be in a permanently fixed location to survive
constitutional scrutiny. 28
The special advantage of the permanently located checkpoints upheld
in Martinez-Fuerte was the high degree of advance notice they af-
forded. Likewise, a permanently located sobriety checkpoint would re-
duce subjective intrusiveness by providing an unusually high degree of
advance notice. 29 Whereas the advance publication of temporary drunk
325 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
326 See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
327 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
328 State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). Contra Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 506-08, 479 A.2d 903, 914 (1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518,
473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984).
32 Certain existing structures, such as tollbooths, could be used as permanent drunk
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driving roadblock sites probably would reach only a small portion of
the driving public, the location of a fixed checkpoint probably would
become common knowledge. Motorists' advance knowledge of the
checkpoint's location would enable those who wished to avoid it to
choose an alternative route.3
For those aware of a permanent sobriety checkpoint, the decision to
pass through it would be essentially voluntary,"' implicating fourth
amendment interests only to the same reduced extent as other consen-
sual searches and seizures. 3" Because it is precisely the nonconsensual
subjection of motorists to coercive police power that makes drunk driv-
ing roadblocks constitutionally objectionable, permanently located road-
blocks would be less troublesome than the usual temporary road-
blocks.33 The same advantage could also be achieved without imposing
the requirement of permanence. Substantial advance notice of a sobriety
checkpoint could be provided through media publicity as well as on-site
signs." '
driving roadblocks. From 1983-85, New York City police operated drunk driving road-
blocks at bridge and tunnel tollbooths. Telephone interview with Lanie Kirschner, New
York Department of Transportation (Apr. 15, 1985).
330 But see supra note 155. If a drunk driver has advance notice of a roadblock, he
may yield the driver's seat to a sober passenger. While such an arrangement would
frustrate the law enforcement goal of apprehending drunk drivers, it would promote the
goal of removing drunk drivers from the road (or, more precisely, from behind the
steering wheel).
331 A permanently located drunk driving roadblock would be similar to airport
screenings in this regard. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23. The more that
any detour to avoid a drunk driving roadblock inconveniences a particular motorist, the
more that roadblock burdens his fourth amendment interests. The individual's right to
remain free from suspicionless searches and seizures would be rendered nugatory if he
had to suffer substantial inconvenience in order to exercise that right.
332 Regarding consensual searches and seizures, see generally W. LAFAvE, supra
note 98, §§ 8.1-.6, at 610-778 (1978).
... A drunk driving roadblock's law enforcement productivity would be substantially
undermined if it were voluntary. See, e.g., supra note 84. However, under a balancing
analysis, the less a search or seizure infringes upon personal freedom or privacy, the
less justification it requires.
"' Some jurisdictions have implemented truly voluntary drunk driving roadblocks,
which approaching motorists are free to avoid altogether, or which they may choose to
drive through without stopping or rolling down their windows. Some courts have held
the voluntary nature of these roadblocks to be essential to their constitutionality. Stark
v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (D. Minn. 1984) ("[Tlhe most important feature
. . . that tips the balance in favor of allowing" police to make automobile stops pursu-
ant to drinking-driving survey "is that participation is completely voluntary."); Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 491-92, 504-06, 479 A.2d 903, 906, 913 (1984).
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E. Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of permissible
searches and seizures not based upon probable cause must be strictly
confined in light of the specific law enforcement goals for which they
are authorized. 35' This limitation is all the more important in the con-
text of suspicionless searches and seizures. Because drunk driving road-
block investigations can easily be used as pretexts for investigating
other crimes,336 it is particularly important to devise measures that will
assist in confining the scope of these investigations to their stated law
enforcement purpose. Here, the exclusionary rule has an important
role. At the very least, police officers conducting sobriety checkpoint
investigations should be prohibited from using evidence of crimes" 7
other than drunk driving.3"
"I See supra text accompanying notes 293-96; see also, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 26, 29 (1968).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 231-45.
Although drunk driving roadblocks should not be utilized to enforce criminal laws
other than those regarding drunk driving, they could permissibly be utilized to enforce
administrative requirements such as those governing driver's licenses and vehicle regis-
trations. A roadblock expressly intended to enforce these administrative requirements
would be independently justifiable. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. For ex-
ample, guidelines developed by the county prosecutor's office in Syracuse, New York
provide for roadblocks designed to serve both administrative and anti-drunk driving
purposes:
[To] determine the validity of inspection and registration stickers of the
vehicles observed; identify those vehicles operating with obvious equipment
defects; identify vehicle operators who appear to be intoxicated; provide
concentrated enforcement visibility; enforce compliance with child restraint
laws; inspect vehicular documents; increase the awareness of the motoring
public of the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law; provide for safer
operation of vehicles; reduction of accidents; and increase the public's per-
ceived risk of arrest for DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED.
ONONDAGA COUNTY, NEW YORK STOP-DWI PROGRAM VEHICULAR SAFETY
ROAD-CHECK PROCEDURE 1 (1982) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review) (capi-
talization in original).
3. Professor Amsterdam has proposed such a rule with respect to every search and
seizure permitted on less than probable cause. He argues that the exclusionary rule is
necessary to confine any such search or seizure to the specific purpose that constituted
its justification:
I would apply the exclusionary rule . . . to stop-and-frisk, and also to
other search-and-seizure practices - such as driver's license checks, if
they are to be permitted at all - where the inability of the courts to
devise and enforce any other effective constraint against the perversion of
limited-purpose police powers into general search warrants leaves - to
use James Otis' classic phrase - the liberty of every man in the hands of
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Fourth amendment values would be even better protected by a broad
exclusionary rule, prohibiting the use of evidence obtained at a sobriety
checkpoint for any criminal prosecution, including for drunk driving.
Under such an exclusionary rule, drunk drivers detected at a roadblock
would be removed from the road and subjected to the full range of
administrative sanctions, including license suspension and revocation,
but they would not face criminal prosecution. In essence, this would
convert drunk driving roadblock investigations into administrative in-
spections, designed primarily to detect a dangerous condition and to
prevent future harm. 39 Some state judges have indicated that a drunk
driving roadblock stop should be upheld if its purpose is to remove
drunk drivers from the road, but invalidated if its purpose is to impose
criminal penalties."' While this single factor should probably not deter-
mine constitutionality,"' it is significant. In contrast with a drunk driv-
every petty officer.
Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 438. In the context of other types of suspicionless mass
searches, judges and scholars have also suggested that an exclusionary rule bar the
prosecutorial use of any "proceeds towards which the search was not, and could not
have been independently, directed." United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1280
(5th Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (airport screening); see also Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 535 (1968) (blanket
Camara-type housing inspections to enforce administrative codes).
... Some experts believe that drunk driving could be dealt with most effectively if it
were altogether decriminalized. See supra note 224.
340 See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 10, 663 P.2d 992, 1001
(1983) (Feldman, J., concurring) (fourth amendment would allow properly planned
and operated roadblocks established for deterrent rather than investigative or apprehen-
sion purposes); cf State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (in
holding that fourth amendment was violated by sobriety checkpoint investigations "for
the purpose of seeking out criminal DUI offenders," court stressed that critical distinc-
tion from Martinez-Fuerte was that checkpoints were not primarily seeking out
criminals).
", The right to be free from official intrusion into personal privacy, security, and
liberty without particularized cause, which underlies the fourth amendment, would still
be violated by a suspicionless sobriety checkpoint investigation, regardless of any con-
straints on how the police could utilize the evidence obtained through that investigation.
See Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984) (imposing restrictions upon
car stops and questioning of drivers even though for research purposes only, and not for
law enforcement). Furthermore, the fact that a search is not aimed at the discovery of
evidence of some crime is only one of the four factors that the Court stressed in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), as a basis for upholding suspicionless admin-
istrative inspections. The other factors would still be absent from the drunk driving
roadblock context, even if drunk driving were decriminalized. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 59-65. Similarly, under a balancing analysis, although decriminalization
should reduce the subjective intrusiveness of a drunk driving roadblock investigation, it
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ing roadblock aimed at criminal prosecutions, a roadblock operated for
the limited purpose of removing drunk drivers from the road would be
more closely analogous to the suspicionless administrative inspections
that the Supreme Court has sustained." '
CONCLUSION
If widely approved, sobriety checkpoints could be set up at shifting
locations all over the country. Neither Border Patrol checkpoint stops
nor any other types of suspicionless investigations that the Supreme
Court has authorized have touched the lives of so many citizens or been
aimed at criminal law enforcement. The acceptance of drunk driving
roadblocks could pave the way for other dragnet searches and seizures
to enforce other criminal laws.
While submission to sobriety checkpoint investigations might seem a
small price to pay for an alleged "solution" to the serious drunk driving
problem, similar "solutions" could be offered for every crime problem.
This Article has pointed out that the effectiveness of drunk driving
roadblocks has not been demonstrated and that enforcement strategies
consistent with the probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard are
at least as productive. The Article has also shown that, notwithstanding
Supreme Court decisions approving other types of suspicionless
searches and seizures, there are strong constitutional as well as policy
reasons to reject drunk driving roadblocks.
Routine roadblocks call to mind the way police and soldiers are
deployed in authoritarian societies. Even if they were conducted in a
uniform and "friendly" manner,343 they would be inconsistent with
would not eliminate subjective intrusiveness. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying
text. Moreover, one would also have to consider the objective intrusiveness of these
investigations, see supra text accompanying notes 229-45, and their "productivity" in
reducing the drunk driving problem. See supra text accompanying notes 167-79.
342 See, supra text accompanying notes 56-60. For this reason, investigations at such
a roadblock would fare better under the balancing analysis than would drunk driving
investigations aimed at criminal prosecutions. From the individual driver's perspective,
drunk driving roadblock investigations that could not lead to criminal prosecution and
punishment should be subjectively less intrusive than those which could. See, e.g.,
supra notes 60, 99, 151, & 263. On the other side of the "reasonableness" balance,
such investigations would be at least as "productive" in removing drunk drivers from
the road as would roadblock investigations directed at criminal enforcement. In fact,
they could even be more productive in achieving this purpose if drunk drivers would
make fewer efforts to avoid such roadblocks.
... See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent.").
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American constitutional and political traditions. We would do well to
recall Justice Robert Jackson's admonition in United States v. Di Re:...
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement will be more
difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of
history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from
punishment.
'" 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); see also supra notes 15, 193, & 290 and text accompa-
nying note 290.
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